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An Important Note to the Attention of the 
Reviewers  
 
 
This dissertation was initially intended as an almost 
entirely quantitative analysis on the judicial decision 
making processes taking place within the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. For this reason the author 
collected an original and novel dataset to include all 
publicly available information for each of the annulment 
action cases that were brought before the Court since 
1954. This dataset is an inseparable part of the thesis and 
it certainly constitutes the major part of the dissertation‟s 
added value as it will enable other scholars to test in 
practice their hypotheses and models on institutionalism 
or EU integration.  
 
The dataset contains all 1102 annulment action cases that 
were registered in the Court by the year of 2005 (this 
year was selected as not all of the cases afterwards had 
their rulings at the time the dataset was prepared) and it 
has 153 variables which needed a period of some 5 
months of uninterrupted efforts to be collected. For its 
huge size the dataset observations are listed in a special 
separate file that will also be presented to the reviewers. 
Hopefully the STATA .dta file (containing the dataset in 
a format ready for statistical analysis) will also be made 
publicly accessible at IMT's website.  
 
All further details concerning the dataset can be found in 
Chapter IV of the present dissertation. 
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Abstract 
 
The thesis is an attempt to present the Court of Justice of 
the European Union as a rational actor performing in a 
strategic manner in accordance to its institutional 
preferences. The Court has been found to follow a self-
perpetuating pattern of decision making that allows it to 
define a political agenda that the institution is aiming to 
achieve. This model is in line with the New 
Institutionalism theoretical assumptions and expectations 
and most especially to its rational choice and historical 
sub-branches.   
 
The findings in the dissertation are mostly in the 
quantitative analysis of an extensive dataset collected by 
the author for the research purposes of the project. The 
qualitative methodology is also used through the case 
study instrument of examining the doctrinal rulings from 
the Court‟s case-law and their relation to the „National 
versus communitarian‟ legal and political conflict and its 
often opposing interests. The key argument in the thesis 
is the finding that the Judges in their rulings at the Court 
of Justice seem to discriminate between the bigger 
countries and the rest of the less powerful EU member 
states. This enables the Court to balance between its 
institutional interests and those of the EU national 
governments which are a potential threat to the Court's 
pursuit of extended powers and competences, which is in 
agreement with all neoinstitutional arguments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
kept attracting the attention of academic scholars as an 
institution that is an active agent in the ongoing clash 
between the national interests of the Member states and 
those of the community. Even though a lot of theories 
have been put forward to explain the driving forces 
behind this conflict, and more specifically the role of the 
Court in this context, one can argue that most of the 
empirical evidence from CJEU case-law is based on the 
principle of case studies that were selected to present a 
certain argument or hypothesis in a more illustrative 
manner. In the last two decades the European Court of 
Justice has been more and more analyzed by purely 
quantitative methods in a manner similar to the one that 
legal scholarship has traditionally applied on its 
American counterpart – the US Supreme Court. 
However, one of the gaps that was left by most of the 
projects examining the Court of Justice is that the accent 
has rarely been put enough on the institution itself. 
Indeed, the Court has been so far presented mostly as a 
ground of competing national and supranational 
interests. Thus, the common aim was to rather find 
evidence in support of arguments originating from the 
main assumptions of the theories of integration or 
international relations but have little to do with the 
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mission for which the Court has been established, or the 
one that it managed to define in the pursuit of its own 
institutional agenda and long-term interests. One of the 
aims of this thesis is to reduce this gap.  
Introduction to the problem 
The problem is that the leading paradigms of the 1990s 
that attempted explaining theoretically the processes of 
European integration – neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism – failed to defeat each other. As a 
result of this we need to search for a solid theory that 
can alone provide a model to explain the features of 
CJEU’s judicial review in the broad picture of 
community and member states competition. Therefore 
we need further investigation into the field of legal 
integration in order to understand how does the Court 
of Justice fit into this constant struggle between national 
and supranational interests. CJEU has been often found 
to serve as an ideal laboratory to prove a point in this 
context. In fact we have enough evidence that the Court 
of Justice is rather an institution that supports and 
deepens integration as most of its decisions were pro-
European. At the same time we often witnessed how the 
Court made some steps back after some of its rulings 
were objected and met with massive disapproval by 
some or most of the EU member states. In this thesis I 
will mostly test to what extent the Court of Justice takes 
into account the political preferences of certain member 
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states (or of member states in general) to trump some 
purely legal circumstances involved in the cases. Of 
course, a profound institutional analysis of the 
European Court of Justice is nevertheless inevitable as 
all internal institutional procedures in the CJEU, as well 
as its legal basis in the Treaty and the legitimacy that 
the judges hold being elected by their own national 
governments can all be observed as expressions of the 
same problem. In brief, the problem is that in most of 
the research so far the focus has rarely been put on the 
Court and this thesis will be an attempt to compensate 
for this.  
Aims and objectives 
The main aim of the dissertation is to provide a 
thorough insight to the Court’s pattern of judicial 
decision making through analysis of the most palpable 
form in which it is publicly available – its rulings. My 
intention is to do so using one and the same theoretical 
framework in which to combine large-N data analysis 
together with qualitative assumptions on a case by case 
basis. I believe it is the neoinstitutional theoretical 
background that could serve best to fulfill this purpose.  
Therefore, the main sub-aim of the dissertation is to 
defend the argument that it is exactly new 
institutionalism that is the most adequate theory that 
should be used to explain the mechanics of CJEU’s 
decision making patterns. In brief, my goal is to put the 
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focus on the Court itself and I believe this to be the most 
natural approach considering the fact that the judiciary 
is one of the independent branches in the separation of 
political powers since Montesquieu.  
My objective is to test whether and to what extent the 
Court takes into account the preferences of the EU 
member states (or a sub-group of these member states) 
in certain policies or whether it is impartial to the 
national interests and its decision making is not 
predetermined by extra legal aspects. Thus my 
dependent variable is the legal outcome of the Court’s 
rulings (applicant won or lost its case) in these cases in 
which there is a clear potential conflict between national 
and European law or interests. My independent 
variables account for many of the legal and non-legal 
factors that the literature suggests have proven to be 
statistically significant in other Courts’ decision making.  
Summary of argument, hypothesis 
My intuition is that there are cases in which the Court 
can decide to go either way for having to deal with 
issues that suppose alternative interpretations. In these 
cases the Court of Justice allows itself to exercise a 
certain dose of behavior that is a function of extra legal 
influences. My argument is that it is neither the national 
nor the supranational considerations that matter in this 
context even though as a result these might be directly 
or indirectly affected. But it is the institutional interests 
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of the Court itself that would turn the balance to one 
side or the other. In a separate chapter I will examine 
from neoinstitutional point of view the seminal works 
in the literature on this perspective of the CJEU. I argue 
that it is the long term desideration of the institution to 
legitimize itself as the Constitutional Court of Europe 
and to increase the scope of its competences that 
predetermine a certain pattern which is incorporated 
into the institutional memory of CJEU. In order to put 
forward a credible request for playing such a role the 
judges are bound to seek for compliance of its rulings as 
it needs the recognition of the EU member states to 
establish firmly its legitimacy. Thus, inevitably the 
Court will take into consideration the extent to which its 
rulings would potentially harm the political agenda of 
the EU member states and especially the bigger ones as 
they pose a more serious treat in this sense. And this is 
exactly the line that rational choice neoinstitutionalists 
are expecting the Court to follow. 
Development of theories/current status 
There is a set of several different theories that can be 
used complementarily for the analysis of the role that 
the Court of Justice might play as a strategic actor 
exploiting its power and competences. The hypothesis 
of regional integration theories such as 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism in general 
explain broader processes and the Court cannot be 
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simply observed only as an instrument in these lines. It 
is the theories of judicial decision making, as well as 
institutionalism that can shed light on the nuances that 
this dissertation intends to point out. Judicial decision 
making theories present a wide range of extra-legal 
variables that were found to impact the rulings of 
different courts. Some of its hypotheses and findings 
will be tested empirically on a novel dataset of CJEU 
case-law. In fact I intend to present this usage of extra-
legal factors as an illustration of the assumptions of 
rational choice institutionalism and the judges as 
individuals who understand the powers and the 
expectations vested in them to make decisions driven 
by their human nature and rational choice. 
The other sub-branch of new institutionalism, namely 
the historical institutionalism, is going to be used in this 
thesis rather descriptively to depict the Court of Justice 
as a classic institution pursuing its own preferences. 
CJEU’s consistency in its rulings is a classical example 
of path dependency in neoinstitutional terms. Whereas 
the precedents that established the main EU legal 
doctrines, such as EU law supremacy and direct effect, 
serve the role of critical junctures in exactly the same 
theoretical framework. This project intends to fit in with 
the literature review of historical institutionalism by 
looking behind the rationale of the main doctrines that 
the Court, as an example of a judicial institution, 
established throughout its case-law in the context of its 
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striving for legitimacy and pursuit of increased 
competences. It will contribute to the principal-agent 
theory by conceptualizing the potential reasons behind 
the existence of unintended consequences that occur 
when an international institution (agent) is created by a 
group of states (principals) to perform certain functions. 
Research methods 
The methodology that will be used to test for the extent 
to which the Court is alert to extra legal factors is 
predominantly quantitative. I expanded the Stone Sweet 
– Brunell dataset of the Court’s case-law to include new 
variables that enable testing for various hypotheses. As 
actions of annulment provide final decisions they can be 
analyzed statistically to control for potential significance 
of preferential treatment towards some of the principles 
(member states that in fact established the Court of 
Justice and have to power to amend the treaties) to 
whom the CJEU is allegedly an agent. I have planned 
having a separate chapter for this statistical analysis 
which is to serve as a proof of the Court’s sensitivity to 
member states’ influence. This chapter will be based on 
multivariate ordered logistic regression analysis run 
over a large number of observations of the Court’s case-
law collected manually in a novel dataset. A special 
attention will be given to the type of applicants which 
decided to bring the cases in front of the Court as it is 
intuitively rational to expect that groups of lawyers, 
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NGOs, transnational companies and member states 
have different interests and if the Court is acting as a 
strategic agent one may assume that its role as a 
mediator will vary accordingly. The main assumption 
here is that the Court will handle more cautiously these 
cases in which the litigants are powerful enough to act 
in a way that may threaten its long-term survival or at 
least reduce the CJEU’s competences, i.e. member state 
governments that may initiate a process of changing the 
treaties.  
On the other hand, preliminary rulings do not generate 
actual rulings but as most main doctrines were 
established by CJEU through this procedure it can serve 
best to illustrate the political agenda of the institution. 
Thus, another chapter will be envisaged to look for a 
potential pattern that the Court followed in its 
preliminary rulings based on a case by case approach in 
a rather descriptive manner. Again, an emphasis will be 
put on the source from which the cases originate (type 
of member state court sending the referral, legal field at 
stake, etc.).  
Future work 
My intentions are to construct a plausible model of 
CJEU decision making that is based on the mentioned 
observations, theoretical expectations and results. My 
intention is therefore to also compare the CJEU to other 
similar international courts in which national and 
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supranational dimensions are simultaneously present. 
In the future this model could be tested on other 
international courts such as the European Court for 
Human Rights, the International Court of Justice or the 
Court of Justice of the Andean Community to test for 
the statistical significance of the key variables found to 
be correlated with the dependant variable in the 
original project. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL 
OVERVIEW 
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History and functions of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was founded with the 
Treaty of Paris (1951) to put into operation the legal 
structure of the European Coal and Steel Community that 
the Treaty established. Later, in 1957, when some three 
treaty organizations emerged by the Treaty of Rome, the 
latter got the ECJ as its joint court. In 1967 as a consequence 
of the merger treaty that consolidated these organizations 
into a European Community (now European Union) the 
European Court of Justice was practically put as the highest 
court in matters of EU law. Each consequent treaty 
extended the legal framework of the Community and thus, 
the ECJ’s powers to rule over it. These expanded 
competencies were most recently defined by the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 after which 
the previously designed three pillar structure of the 
European Union was abandoned for being communitarized 
and the Court was renamed to its current title – The Court 
of Justice of the European Union. The number of cases that 
the Court of Justice has to rule on has grown enormously 
since the establishment of the institution. The workload of 
the Court has increased from 79 cases in 1970 to more than 
2000 cases in the year of 2010. That is why in 1989 the Court 
of First Instance was founded to share the burden of the 
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increased number of cases.1  Both courts are located in 
Luxembourg. 
 
One of the main functions of the CJEU is to interpret EU 
law and to provide that it will be uniformally applied in all 
EU member states. The Court is to resolve interinstitutional 
and intergovernmental legal arguments. It is not only 
member states and institutions that can bring cases before 
the Court of Justice but also companies and individuals 
provided that their rights were violated in respect to the 
European law. According to one of the leading scholars 
studying the Court, Karen Alter, the Court of Justice was 
founded in order to perform three roles for the member 
states: to ensure that the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers are not exceeding their competences, to fill in the 
unclear aspects of EC law by interpreting it in its case-law, 
and to decide on charges of non-compliance that were 
raised by the EU member states or the Commission.2 
 
 
Composition of the Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice has one judge per each EU member 
state: 27 judges at present. The Court is assisted by eight 
advocates-general whose task is to provide their opinions 
                                                 
1
 The Court of First Instance was renamed the 'General Court' in the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
2
 Alter, Karen. “Who are the „Masters of the Treaty‟?: European Governments 
and the European Court of Justice.” International Organization 52.1 (1998): 
121-147. 
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on the cases that are brought before the CJEU. They must 
do so publicly and impartially. Each judge and advocate-
general is appointed for a renewable mandate of six years. 
Generally it is the EU governments that agree on whom 
they will appoint and assignment of the judges has to be 
done ‘by common accord of the Governments of the 
Member States’.3 In practice, each government put his 
candidate forward and he or she is normally accepted by 
the others. According to the treaties the judges must be 
‘persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who 
posses the qualification required for appointment to the 
highest judicial officers in their respective countries or who 
are jurisconsults of recognized competence’.4 For the latter 
option often it has been the case that academic professors of 
EU or international law were appointed even if they are not 
permitted to perform in judges in their respective 
homelands. There is no retirement age for the judges but 
during their stay in office they are not allowed to hold any 
political or administrative position outside the Court.  
The judges elect by secret vote the President of the Court 
for a term of three years that can be renewed. The 
President’s responsibility is to be in charge of the 
administrative business of the institution as well as to 
preside the sessions for these cases that are brought before 
a full Court. The Court of Justice is divided into chambers 
of three and five judges. These chambers have one of the 
                                                 
3
 Article 223 of the TEU (ex. Art. 167 EC Treaty) 
4
 Ibid 
14 
 
member judges as a president who is elected by his 
colleagues as well. Each judge, at the very beginning of his 
mandate, swears to be impartial in his duties and to keep 
the secrecy of the deliberations that are to take place in the 
cases he will rule on during his career.  
 
In general the judges are independent from their national 
governments even though they are appointed by the latter. 
One of the most important reasons for this is the lack of 
dissenting judgments and the fact that the Court’s rulings 
are issued publicly in a way that no one can understand 
how did each of the separate judges vote. In addition to 
that the President of the Court is unlikely to forward a case 
that is potentially sensitive for some national government 
to a chamber that has a judge of the same nationality.  
 
The eight Advocates General usually include one of each of 
the four big EU states (Germany, France, Italy and UK). 
Even though they never take part of the Court’s 
deliberations they are considered as equals to the judges in 
terms of hierarchy and ranking in the Court. The Rules of 
Procedure envisage a secret vote for electing the First 
Advocate General. His term is for one year. Whenever a 
new case is brought before the Court of Justice the First 
Advocate General should choose an Advocate General to 
whom the case is to be assigned. The chosen Advocate 
General is to perform the necessary legal research and to 
present his opinion to the Court. Even though the Court is 
not obliged to follow it the judges usually do so in some 
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80% of the cases. The Advocate General opinions are issued 
together with the Court’s ruling in the official reports. This 
is actually a first opinion given on the case and the judges 
have admitted more often than never that they use it as a 
starting point for the internal discussion and deliberations 
on the cases.  
 
 
Types of cases 
The CJEU has the competency of giving judgments on the 
following five types of cases that are most often brought 
before it: 
1. Requests for a preliminary ruling – these are cases in 
which a national court decided to ask the Court of 
Justice to give its opinion of a vague issue of EU law. 
The national courts of the member states are in 
charge of the proper application of European Law. 
In order to provide uniform interpretation the 
national courts often use the preliminary ruling 
instrument for getting the Court’s advice. In some 
cases the national courts are even obliged to do so. 
In its preliminary ruling the Court of Justice only 
explains its views on the Community law questions 
that it was asked to interpret. Thus, the Court does 
not decide the case and the ruling is left for the 
national court that referred the question. 
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Nevertheless, in practice national courts by default 
follow strictly the advice of the CJEU. 
2. Actions for failure to fulfill an obligation – cases in 
which one or several of the EU member state 
governments got brought before the Court for not 
complying with European law. Such a proceeding is 
usually initiated by the Commission even though in 
theory it can be done by another member state as 
well. If the Court finds that the respective state is not 
fulfilling its obligations its government needs to 
undertake the necessary actions in accordance with 
the treaties. The Court can also issue a fine if the 
member state does not follow the provisions of its 
ruling. 
3. Actions for annulment – cases in which EU 
secondary legislation (directives, regulations, 
decisions or some other legal acts adopted by EU 
institutions) was found to contradict the EU treaties. 
Such a proceeding can be started by the Council, the 
Commission, the Parliament, and by any EU 
member state or a group of member states. Any 
combination of these is also possible to appear 
before the Court as a joint plaintiff. Individuals or 
companies can also ask for annulment of certain 
Community acts but they need to prove that the 
latter impacted them individually as otherwise their 
action for annulment will be ruled away by the 
Court as inadmissible.   
17 
 
4. Actions for failure to act – cases against EU 
institutions for failure of the latter to undertake an 
action of their competences in accordance to 
European legislation. EU institutions are required to 
act or take decisions in some cases according to the 
treaty. In case they did not perform their duties 
member states or other EU institution can bring 
them in Court so that this failure to act can be 
established. 
5. Direct actions – cases brought by non-government 
organizations or individuals against decisions or acts 
of the Community. Any company or person who has 
experienced losses as a consequence of a certain 
community act or inaction is eligible to seek for 
compensation by bringing his case before the Court 
of Justice. 
The Rules of Procedure  
The procedural order in the Court was initially designed in 
a way to resemble the one that is featured by the 
International Court of Justice. The procedure can be 
divided into four different stages: the written proceedings, 
the preparatory inquiry, the oral hearing, and the 
judgment.5 These stages differ in cases where the Court has 
been asked for a preliminary ruling as in these cases there 
                                                 
5
 Hartley, Trevor. The Foundations of European Union Law. 7th edition. 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
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are practically no parties and the role of the Court is simply 
to assist this national court that has send the request 
through its interpretation of EU law. 
1. The written proceedings 
The procedure begins with what is called an application in 
which the plaintiff has to explain the reasons for his claim. 
This application is to be sent to the Court’s Registrar. The 
Registrar will provide it with a case number and will then 
send it to the defendant. The defendant then has a month to 
present his defense. The plaintiff may then decide to write 
a reply to which the defendant can again answer. It is at 
this point that the defendant may object the admissibility of 
the case. This matter involves most usually the question 
whether the case is within the scope of the Court’s 
competences. It is the Advocate General who gives an 
opinion on the issue on a special session at which the Court 
is to decide whether to sustain the admissibility objection 
or to deny it.  
2. Preparatory Inquiry 
At this phase the Court is to decide what evidence will be 
needed to verify the questions of fact. At the moment that 
the application has been registered the President of the 
Court assigns the case to a Chamber of his own choice and 
selects one of the judges of this chamber as the Judge 
Rapporteur for the case. At the same time the First 
Advocate General will assign the case to one of the 
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Advocate Generals in the Court. The Judge Rapporteur has 
to summarize the factual matters in his report which he 
will present to the attention of the Court. Normally the 
Court finds it enough to determine questions of fact based 
on the examination of documents. In rare occasions the 
judges may decide to hear witnesses to whom both sides, 
the judges, as well as the Advocate General may ask 
questions.  
3. Oral Procedure 
The day of the hearing is preceded by the Judge 
Rapporteur’s report which is to be commented in the 
speeches of both parties. In contrast to other Courts 
where the oral hearing is usually of great significance 
this stage is less decisive for the CJEU judges as in the 
cases brought before it the factual matters have been 
determined earlier. Once the parties have concluded 
discussions the Court adjourns and this is the time in 
which the Advocate General has to prepare his opinion. 
As soon as he is ready both parties are invited to hear it 
which is the end of the oral stage.  
4. Judgment 
The judges have their deliberations in which only they 
are allowed to be present. The Judge Rapporteur has the 
responsibility to present a written draft of the judgment 
and this is the document that serves as a starting point 
for the discussion of the judges. The procedure 
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envisages a vote to be taken if necessary to reach a 
decision. In such cases the judges vote in turn of 
seniority having the most junior of them voting first. 
Decisions are taken with simple majority but voting is 
secret and in the end the issued judgment is single and 
has the signatures of all the judges on it. Thus, it is 
never known whether the judges in the chamber have 
reached a consensus or had a minority opposing the 
final judgment. The judgment is finally read in open 
court after which it is also published officially together 
with the opinion of the Advocate General. The 
judgments of the Court of Justice are no subject of 
appeals even though there are some special provisions 
which allow for a ruling to be reviewed, i.e. if there was 
a case of breached procedural rules. Actually appeal 
cases can be brought before the Court of Justice – these 
appear in cases coming from litigants contesting a 
decision from the Court of First Instance.  
 
Languages in the Court 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is a 
multilingual Court as all the official languages of the 
Union are working languages for its institutions. All 
documents are always translated into the official 
languages of all current member states. Since the very 
beginning however French has a principal role in the 
Court. That is probably a result of the fact that the 
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United Kingdom joined the Community in 1973 – well 
after it was founded. In addition to that the very first 
treaty (the one of the European Coal and Steal 
Community) that was signed in 1951 was drafted only 
in French which is also an official language in 3 of the 6 
states that established the ECSC.6 The very structure of 
French administrative law has also enjoyed a dominant 
position among the legal systems of the majority of the 
founding member states.7  
The language of each case is usually determined 
depending on the nationality of the applicant or the 
defendants. The litigants are however aware of the fact 
that judges cannot understand most of the official 
Union languages, so a French- or an English-speaking 
lawyer is more likely to present before the Court.8 
Judges sit alone during their deliberations and 
interpreters are not allowed in their room. The Court 
has adopted French as its working language. As a result 
the drafts and the final version of the judgment are 
given in French and only then translated into the 
language of the case.  
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Judicial Activism  
Judicial activism as a concept in law terminology 
concerns the occasions in which a Court creates law. 
This role of any court is inevitably in conflict with the 
legislature as it has a political aspect. The Court of 
Justice has more often than never based its rulings not 
only on the texts of the treaties or the secondary 
European legislation but has adopted for itself the 
mission of promoting further European integration. In 
order to achieve this mission the Court has formed its 
own institutional agenda by pursuing the policy of 
strengthening the Union by increasing the scope of 
Community law and expanding the powers and 
competences of the EU institutions including itself. The 
most important aspect of this process has been the 
establishment of some legal principles and doctrines 
that changed effectively the relations between the 
member states and the Union. For a political scientist it 
is of a great interest to research the instances in which a 
court has performed such a judicial activism because 
these are really the moments where the institution 
reveals how it understands the general reasons for its 
existence and the way it defines the mission it is there to 
achieve. Therefore it is worth mentioning some of the 
most illustrative cases in which the Court managed to 
read what was not actually written in the treaties and 
would probably never appear there if the process of 
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legal integration was to be lead only by the national 
governments. 
One of the most famous cases is the Les Verts vs. 
European Parliament.9 Les Verts is the French green 
party which brought the European Parliament before 
the Court for its decision to allocate money from the 
community budget in a way that the party found 
discriminatory against parties which were not 
represented in the current European Parliament. The 
treaty was clear enough that the Court of Justice can 
review the legality of the acts of the Council and the 
Commission. In other words there was a problem with 
the admissibility of the case as the legality of acts of the 
European Parliament was not mentioned as a subject of 
the Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless the judges 
decided that the annulment action is admissible. The 
Court based its ruling on the general spirit of the treaty 
which according to the judges provides for establishing 
the rule of law uniformly throughout the union and 
thus the acts of the member states and all community 
institutions should be subject of review even if these 
were not expressly listed. With a stroke of the pen the 
judges formally expanded their jurisdiction to cover the 
legality of the European Parliament’s acts by claiming 
that the Court is thus simply filling in a gap that was 
left in the treaties. Indeed the Court has followed a 
similar logic in an earlier case where it was decided that 
                                                 
9
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the GATT10 was also a subject of its judicial review as an 
agreement which is binding on the Community. 
Otherwise, as it is argued in the judgment, the 
agreement could not only ‘receive uniform application 
throughout the Community’ but ‘the unity of the 
common commercial policy would also be 
jeopardized’.11 
In another case from its 1980s case-law the Court had to 
rule on whether the European Parliament can be the 
source of an action for annulment of Council’s acts. At 
the time of the case the treaties did not mention the 
Parliament as a potential initiator of an annulment 
action. Nevertheless the Court decided that: 
‘The absence in the Treaties of any provision 
giving the Parliament the right to bring an action 
for annulment may constitute a procedural gap, 
but it cannot prevail over the fundamental interest 
in the maintenance and observance of the 
institutional balance laid down in the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities. 
Consequently, an action of annulment brought by 
the parliament against an act of the Council or the 
Commission is admissible.’ 12 
It is these cases that reveal the political mission of a 
Court which has proven that it can base the rulings on its 
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views on what the law should be even if it does not match 
the exact wording of the treaties. It has to be pointed put 
that of all EU institutions, the Court of Justice has probably 
went farthest in limiting national sovereignty by the 
establishment of the EU law supremacy principle and by 
imposing the obligation of member states to implement 
it.13 The principles of supremacy and direct effect however, 
will be examined in more detail in another chapter of this 
thesis. 
Compliance  
The instances of judicial activism are often sensitive 
and usually met with criticism and negative reactions by 
the member states. Even though the judiciary is 
theoretically independent the Court of Justice, similarly to 
all other international courts, needs to take into account 
the way its rulings are likely to be accepted by the 
European governments. This is partly for the lack of such 
institutions in the Union (i.e. communitarized police) 
which may enforce sanctions in case certain national 
officials or institutions decide to not comply with the 
decisions of the Court. Consequently a provision of 
imposing fines on the non-complying governments was 
introduced in the 1990s. Fines however have rarely been 
effective as a measure of preventing member states non-
compliance as usually the Court sets a small amount of 
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money as a monetary penalty.14 In addition there is 
evidence that when a state is found to infringe EU rules it 
can escape punishment for an average period of ten 
years.15 The Court should always be careful in the pursuit 
of its political agenda as the only way it can be perceived 
as a legitimate and a neutral actor is if its judgments are 
actually complied with. To date there is probably a single 
case in which a member state has openly refused to obey 
to the Court’s decision. This happened in the so called 
Sheepmeat case in which the judges decided that France 
had to allow lamb and mutton imports in accordance with 
Community law.16 The French government has blatantly 
announced that it will not comply with the ruling before 
the Union adopts a mechanism to protect French farmers 
and threatened to ignore the Court by keeping the 
abovementioned trade barriers. The French pressure was 
strong enough for the Court to make a step back from its 
stand in the consequent action that the Commission 
brought against France for its non-compliance. Thus the 
case was never actually resolved and in the end the issue 
was settled with an intergovernmental deal that appeased 
all involved sides (with the UK being the state mostly 
opposing the French government’s decision). 
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NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
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INSTITUTIONS 
This chapter is about institutions. Why institutions exist, 
how do they survive through the course of time and how 
they predetermine the boundaries of political behavior. 
These are the basic questions that the theory of new 
institutionalism and its different strands are trying to 
examine form the perspective of political analysis. Douglas 
North’s classical presentation of the institutions as ‘the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction’17 is probably the most widespread definition. 
Using such a definition however one should strictly 
distinguish the difference between an institution and an 
organization. Indeed if we understand institutions as the 
set of rules for making decisions then the organizations that 
political scientists examine can be observed simply as 
players18. 
The literature often does not take into account this 
confusion and the term institution is practically associated 
with the organizations that are there to follow the 
established institutional rules.19 Even though the 
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institutions are, in the most general sense, only rules we 
can not use North’s definition for the purpose of this thesis 
as the focus here is rather on the organization – the Court 
of Justice of the European Union – which was founded with 
a mission to perform within the boundaries of these rules. 
It is these rules that lay at the basis of political performance 
as politics cannot be organized in a lack of institutions. 
Politics is structured by institutions as they define the 
political actors that are allowed to perform and influence 
the preferences of these actors.20 On the other hand 
institutionalism is the theory of studying political 
institutions and the way they affect political decision-
making outcomes. In political science the term was first 
used by March and Olsen in the 1980s when they claimed 
that organization of politics can predetermine political 
outcomes.21  
Institutionalism developed to a stage in which practically 
all social sciences currently have a new institutionalism of 
their own. With the progress that institutionalists borrowed 
from so different fields such as these of psychology, 
economics, statistics and international relations, manage to 
expand our knowledge on institutions and institutional 
change. In recent years, with the development of political 
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science scholarship on the European Union and its 
institutions, new institutionalism is more often used in 
explaining the Union’s decision-making processes. This is 
totally in line with March and Olsen beliefs that political 
democracy depends not only on economic and social 
conditions but also on the design of political institutions.22  
There is a common understanding shared by the 
institutionalists that the functioning of institutions depends 
on the circumstances in which the appear and endure. 
However within the school of new institutionalism there 
are various assumptions about the laws that govern politics 
and thus several sub-categories of institutionalism 
emerged. The main three branches of new institutionalism 
are rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.  
 
These three strands differ in their very definition of what 
an institution is. According to historical institutionalists 
institutions are rules and assets taken over from the past 
which are embedded in concrete temporal processes.23 
Institutions are thus perceived as constantly developing 
structures which change over time as a result of different 
social or political outcomes. The procedures and routines 
which institutions constitute are considered a dynamic 
function of enduring legacies of past political struggles.24 
                                                 
22
 Ibid 
23
 Thelen, Kathleen. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. 
Annual Review of Political Science 1999.2; 369-404. 1999 
24
 Ibid 
31 
 
On the other hand rational choice institutionalists imply on 
the reasons of institutions’ existence and the rationality of 
the actors that created them. They focus on the practical 
purposes of inventing institutions and on the preferences of 
the sides involved in a certain institutional behavior. In this 
chapter the theories of rational choice and the historical 
institutionalism will be observed in further detail. In 
addition to this there are two separate chapters containing 
evidence to examine the validity of these theories 
assumptions when the decision making processes in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union are concerned. Such 
an analysis would of course be more complete and precise 
if it could be properly performed through the lenses of 
sociological institutionalism as well. However, most of the 
potential proofs to confirm the sociological dimension of 
judicial decision making within the CJEU are practically 
not available. We know too little about the social 
interactions between the judges in Luxembourg. The 
individual input that each of them undoubtedly has as a 
human being put under the conditions of interpersonal 
interactions is almost impossible to measure. The final 
rulings of the Court of Justice may be public but neither the 
deliberations of the judges, nor their personal votes were 
ever revealed in accordance with the principles of secrecy 
that each judge vows to maintain even after the end of his 
mandate.  
 
It is exactly for this reason that I decided not to include an 
in-depth analysis of the sociological institutionalist 
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perspective.25 Still, for the sake of completion it is worth 
mentioning the views of the sociological institutionalism 
which implies that institutions are socially constructed and 
embody formally the different societal norms and cultural 
perceptions of how the world functions.26 For this type of 
institutionalism the human nature and the acceptable 
interpersonal behavior are variables that predetermines the 
preferences of the actors in an institution and thus these 
actors’ interactions are also a function of the relevant 
individual identities.27 An illustration of a sociological 
institutional approach to the judicial activism of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union would be the assumption 
that the famous doctrines EU law supremacy and direct 
effect would not happen in the 1960s if it was not for the 
two new judges that entered the Court in 1962 – the French 
Robert Lecourt and the Italian judge Alberto Trabucchi. 
Both of these are known to have been in favor of 
establishment of the direct effect doctrine while other 
sources suggest that judge Hammes and judge Donner as 
well as the Advocate General Roemer were opposing the 
principle. As Ditlev Tamm has put it:  
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‚A qualified guess of oral testimony is that Lecourt and 
Trabucchi were followed by the Italian Rossi and the 
Belgian Delvaux thus making a narrow majority‛28  
 
Personal leadership, national legal traditions or individual 
background are certainly an interesting subject of research. 
If rational choice institutionalism is at one of the ends of the 
historical institutionalism approach to institutions than 
sociological institutionalism is on the other. However, in 
the case of the Court of Justice, the subtle notions with 
which these factors might have influenced the judicial 
decision making is practically impossible to be observed 
profoundly. The only quantifiable exceptions that I found 
in this context are the nationality and the seniority (the 
number of years in office) of the CJEU judges.29 
 
RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 
The rational choice is a paradigm that was originally 
introduced to economics. Its main assumption is that actors 
are rational and their actions can therefore be extracted as 
logical choices determined by their own preferences and 
motives, as well as those of the rest of the actors. In practice 
actors are expected to be selfish individuals whose overall 
goal is to optimize their so called Utility function trying to 
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exploit the information they know. A classical definition of 
a rational agent is the one of Shepsle: 
‚One who comes to a social situation with preferences over 
possible social states, beliefs about the world and a capacity 
to employ these data intelligently. Agent behaviour takes 
the form of choices based on either intelligent calculation or 
internalised rules that reflect optimal adaptation to 
experience.‛30  
The general mechanics of how politics works according to 
rational choice institutionalists is best captured by Hall and 
Taylor who claim that the rational actors have fixed 
preferences and act in a highly strategic manner in the 
pursuit of the maximization of these preferences.31 Politics 
is therefore a series of collective action dilemmas and it is 
the mentioned strategic interaction that settles the 
outcomes. In this process institutions come to serve as the 
instrument that structures the interaction among the 
different actors and to direct them towards certain desired 
outcomes ‚by affecting the range and sequence of 
alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing 
information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce 
uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others and 
allow gains from exchange.32  
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Of course actors act within certain institutional context 
which is defined and bounded by the rules, norms and 
practices of the respective organizational setting. The critics 
of rational institutionalism point out that the latter follow a 
rather mechanic understanding of actor preferences which 
leads to the design of simplistic models based on too 
narrow assumptions. Therefore, rational institutionalism 
fails to capture some complex interactions that are an 
essential part of the way institutions function.33 Even 
though a common critique of rational choice 
institutionalism is that it overemphasises institutions and 
structures and down plays choice and agency34 political 
scientists examining the European Union have recently 
started looking for explanations of policy outcomes in 
institutions as a collective entities and not so much in the 
preferences of individuals that perform within the 
boundaries of these institutions. In other words institutions 
are instruments that individuals need to achieve their 
goals.   
The views of rational choice institutionalists justify the 
existence of institutions by their intended functions. It is the 
effects that were envisaged to occur out of the institution 
existence that predetermined its establishment. In this 
understanding rational institutionalism seems to agree with 
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the principal-agent models35 in Political Science. These models 
are featured by having legitimate decision-makers (principals) 
which choose to delegate some of their competencies by 
creating a certain institution (an agent) that will facilitate the 
process for the principal by reducing its transaction costs.36 
Delegation occurs if the expected gains exceed the costs for 
the principal. The costs of delegation are obviously highest in 
instances where the agent either can not perform as it was 
instructed to, or when the agent has the opportunity to form 
and follow its own preferences which do not coincide with 
those of the principal. 
 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Historical institutionalists are more focused on the 
evolutionary nature of institutions. Thus, in contrast to 
rational choice institutionalists, they put the accent on the 
institution as a concept which rather forms individual 
behavior instead of being a function out of it. Indeed 
human interaction is so complex that it is extremely 
unlikely to have it balanced around a point of equilibrium 
which depends on a clear set of rational actor’s preferences. 
Koeble argues that ‚Individuals are embedded in so many 
social, economic and political relationships beyond their 
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cognition and control that it is almost absurd to speak of 
utility-maximizing and rational behavior in a strictly 
economic sense‛37. 
 
The methodology of historical institutionalism is opposite 
in its direction compared to one of the rational 
institutionalists. There is not necessarily a disagreement 
that individuals are acting in a strategic manner, but it is 
the historical observations of this behavior that will tell us 
more about its elements and about the priorities of the 
actors. Therefore, according to historical institutionalists, 
the more adequate approach is the empirical analysis of the 
instances illustrating the functioning of an institution. As 
March and Olsen put it there is a certain ‚logic of 
appropriateness‛ in institutional matters.38 It is the personal 
perception of the agents’ own responsibilities and 
delegated duties that to a great extent shape the reactions 
of the individuals. This concept is often referred to as 
normative neoinstitutionalism but the general idea is that 
institutional life cannot be understood only in abstract 
terms of some assumed rationality but also through the 
beliefs of individual actors that their decisions come to 
serve the mission for which their institution exists.  
 
Analyses of historical institutionalism are centered around 
institutional development over the course of time, as well 
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as the particular context in which they developed.39 For this 
purpose the concepts of path dependency and critical 
junctures are very useful and are considered fundamental 
for historical institutionalism. Path dependence is 
characterized by the way in which past decisions have 
framed the boundaries of further institutional 
development. It was not after the 1960s that social scholars 
realized that historical outcomes have often had a very 
long-term impact. In some cases the costs of diversion from 
the path are often so high that institutions are left with one 
or just several possible options. As Pierson argues ‚once a 
certain path is established self-enforcing mechanism make 
reversals very difficult.40 The timing of events is also of 
essential significance according to historical 
institutionalists. In other words some minor episodes that 
happened in the early stages of institutional development 
might have been more influential compared to more recent 
events which might otherwise look like being more 
significant for their actual wider-spread impact.  
 
It is because of this distinction that the concept of critical 
junctures appeared. In a period of a critical juncture a 
situation or a decision has set a particular path that 
somehow predetermined the consequent path of events. 
The periods in between are known as periods of 
continuity.41 Historical institutionalism is practically a 
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comparative approach and is therefore relying mostly on 
case studies. Historical institutionalist scholars are looking 
into these occasions in which a certain option was chosen 
among others that would have potentially resulted in 
another path of dependency. Thus continuity periods are 
examined as an immediate outcome of the critical 
junctures. They are periods in which the recurrence of the 
chosen pattern is simply reinforced. The reasons behind the 
critical junctures are not so important for the historical 
institutionalists. Indeed, one of the main weakness of the 
concept is the fact critical junctures are usually recognized 
once their long term effect has appeared as one needs to 
have the retrospect sight to identify the juncture. Therefore, 
once identified, critical junctures are interesting also for the 
rational institutionalist it is assumed in their theory that 
actors exploited the opportunity to choose a certain path in 
line with their own interests. This is another indicator that 
rational and historical institutionalisms can well be used 
complementary as they are anyway laid on assumptions 
that do not necessarily contradict to each other.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the main streams of New Institutionalism has its 
weaknesses and limitations explaining the processes of 
institutional change. Actors are practically operating within 
a system of incomplete and biased information. It means 
that they have to take decisions in a state of a bounded 
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rationality. This creates problems in analyses of 
institutions. In any case institutions emerge and endure for 
a reason. Political institutions are usually established to 
decrease uncertainty, to structure certain processes and to 
lower the transaction costs involved. However, with time 
institutions tend to shape their own preferences and they 
are trying to follow a so called logic of appropriateness 
which is perceived as their mission. In this process 
institutions are struggling to survive and this survival is 
easier if they happen to affirm their legitimacy and manage 
to expand their institutional competences. In the following 
chapters I will try the present the case of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union within these lines of 
argument.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
New Institutionalism and 
the Court of Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
“The European Court of Justice is a political court with a political 
agenda. Its rulings, time and again, are based on principles that 
the Court simply creates and which have no legal basis in the 
Treaties themselves. As one of its former judges has admitted, the 
European Court of Justice, is a court with a “mission”. That 
mission is to create a federal Europe.” Sir James Goldsmith, 
199642 
   
Modeling Judicial Decision Making 
 
What factors predetermine judicial decision making? A 
court, as an institution, would ideally be expected to act as 
a simple tool to apply the law automatically. Thus, judges 
should serve as individuals formally solving rather 
practical questions based on the generally accepted legal 
norms. In fact that was what scholars in the field initially 
considered as the main reasoning behind judicial behavior. 
This model has been for long qualified as somehow naïve 
and incomplete. C. Herman Pritchett was one of the first 
scholars to question it in a scientific manner providing 
empirical evidence.43 In the 1940s Pritchett claimed that 
judges’ personal policy preferences influence significantly 
their rulings and thus he set the foundations of the 
attitudinal model which other scholars upgraded later. In a 
series of publications in the 50s and the 60s some American 
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political scientists, principally Glendon Schubert and 
Harold Spaeth, argued that the use of quantitative methods 
would improve our understanding of judicial behavior and 
examined extensive databases of judicial decisions to 
provide evidence in favor of the attitudinal model. It did 
not last long before other scholars added the dimensions of 
personal or institutional policy agenda to further develop 
the analysis of the allegedly strategic judicial decision 
making.  
 
These models are not in contradiction to each other but are 
rather complementary and in different circumstances it is 
different factors that are found to matter. It is worth 
emphasizing that up to date the majority of the scholars 
that approached the subject are American. Hence, it is not 
surprising that their analyses referred almost exclusively to 
the US Supreme Court. However, the institutional and 
procedural constraints that courts inevitably have to face 
differ essentially from case to case. Therefore, one should 
be exceptionally careful when he or she extrapolates the 
findings and even the approach that seemed to explain 
judicial reasoning in other legal systems. The numerous 
studies of the Supreme Court’s judicial decision making 
provided evidence for some extra-legal aspects such as the 
judges backgrounds and attitudes, public opinion or 
institutional constraints which happened to influence the 
rulings at the expense of the law. In this thesis I intend to 
test some of these factors as variables that might have 
determined the decisions of the Court of Justice from the 
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perspective of new institutionalism. As clarified in the 
previous chapter, once ideas get institutionalized, they tend 
to often be exploited in a strategic rational manner so that 
the institution that is applying them provides better 
grounds for its legitimacy, and thus, its own survival. 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is such a 
peculiar legal institution that it can hardly be compared to 
any other court on the globe. Nevertheless, it enjoys a great 
deal of academic attention as its role is crucial in another 
theoretical debate. The leading theories of European 
integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, 
disagree in their beliefs about the origin of the driving 
forces behind CJEU rulings and both camps present 
evidence in an attempt to refute the opponent views. This 
vigorous debate led to the unjustified assumption that one 
of the sides is generally wrong and thus it is preferable to 
approach the Court in the alternative way. Moreover, it 
seems that scholars examining the Court of Justice so far 
did not succeed in isolating the effect of purely legal and 
technical factors from the extra-legal ones. That vital gap 
produced certain problems of selection bias and 
heterogeneity among observations in the relevant 
quantitative studies which are anyway still quite scanty.  
 
It may even be taken for granted that the processes of 
European integration have influenced the way the Court of 
Justice functions. The reverse, of course, seems just as right. 
However, a judicial institution as a Court is foremost 
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characterized by its independence and therefore it is at least 
inappropriate to observe it within the same hierarchical 
dimensions as the rest of the EU institutions. Exactly for 
this reason one of my main arguments in this dissertation is 
that if the Court is acting within a frame that predetermines 
the boundaries of its powers then this restrictions are rather 
posed by the EU legislation and only thus, indirectly, by 
the member states’ influence and agenda. This framework 
can therefore hardly be explained by general theories of 
integration and I argue that it is the micro level of technical, 
institutional and legal analysis through which we can 
understand better the judicial decision making of the CJEU 
and the extent to which the Court takes into account 
external factors.  
 
Hence, I believe it is more adequate to observe the Court 
from the perspectives of neoinstitutionalism and its 
subcategories. Indeed, this does not mean that the Court of 
Justice will be examined as an entirely separate institution 
which has nothing to do with the mainstream of European 
politics. The Court’s decision-making in the context of its 
interdependence with the political agenda of EU member 
states can be better explained (Chapter IV) by rational 
neoinstitutionalism instead of using the 
intergovernmentalist approach presenting the institution as 
a simple agent of the principals (EU member states). If the 
Court was a mere instrument in the hands of the member 
states one can hardly explain the regularly announced 
discontent of the latter with the rulings of the judges in 
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Luxembourg which have often been in contradiction with 
the officially expressed position of even the strongest 
European governments. On the other hand, the arguments 
of neofunctionalism that the Court has followed a certain 
pattern of pro-European behaviour in its judgments for the 
spill-over effect of European integration also does not hold 
true in a vast number of cases in which the Court restricted 
the scope or even annulled certain directives and 
regulations that would deepen and widen the integration 
within the Union. The tracks of the Court’s pro-European 
pattern of decision making could probably be better found 
through the means of historical instituionalism (Chapter V) 
and its concepts of path dependency and critical junctures.  
 
For the reasons of my argument I need a brief overview of 
the key findings in the literature concerning the Court’s 
decision making. I will address these in neoinstitutional 
terms trying to explain that the extent of independence that 
the judiciary encompass has proven to be strong enough to 
make the CJEU an agent that cannot be viewed through 
merely neofunctional or intergovernmental lenses. 
 
Theoretical Concepts in European Integration and 
Judicial Decision Making 
 
Intergovernmentalism vs Neofunctionalism 
 
Probably the first systematic attempt to test empirically the 
interdependence between CJEU and the concrete political 
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situation in which the Court had to consider the 
preferences of the European Commission and the EU 
member states was an article of Eric Stein that was 
published in 1981.44 Stein took 11 crucial cases in which the 
Court of Justice delivered decisions maintaining further 
legal integration in the EU. In almost all of these the 
Commission supported the pro-European ruling, while 
there were at least some of the member states that opposed 
in all of the cases. Stein also considered the opinion of the 
Advocate-General which seems to be well correlated with 
the actual legal outcome. These findings came to convince 
academic circles that the Court fits better the 
neofunctionalists explanation of European integration. 
Neofunctionalism, a theory proposed by Ernst Haas in 
1960s, assumes the decline of the power of the nation-state 
and, as opposed to intergovernmentalism, predicts the shift 
towards supranational institutions in matters that involve 
widening and deepening the regional integration.45 The 
argument of the neofunctionalists is that often 
supranational institutions have undertaken and enforced 
actions that would never take place if these decisions were 
up to the member states to decide upon. In this context the 
role of the Court of Justice has been vital and Stein’s paper 
helped the revival of neofunctionalism which was 
announced dead by its inventor – Haas –  shortly after the 
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Luxembourg ‚empty chair‛ crises in the late 1960s. In his 
own words ‚the Court fashioned a constitutional 
framework for a federal-type structure in Europe‛. An 
institution is similar to a human being – it is trying to 
provide its survival and then, if possible, to become more 
powerful. In the case of the CJEU that would mean 
extending the scope of its competencies. The number of 
cases in Stein’s paper is far from being big enough to allow 
any conclusive evidence about the nature of the Court’s 
decision making. In any case though, in some of the cited 
rulings the Court managed to increase its powers 
exploiting an opportunity to indoctrinate the principles that 
it established totally in line with the theory of historical and 
rational institutionalism. 
 
The allegedly revived neofunctionalism in the 1980s 
triggered a quick response by the camp of the 
intergovernmentalists after Stein’s paper. The principal-
agent (PA) analysis is probably the dominant approach to 
the study of delegation in international politics and it 
somehow fits the intergovernmental ideas on European 
integration. By definition, principals are those actors who 
create agents, through a formal act in which the former 
confers upon the latter some authority to govern, that is, to 
take authoritative, legally-binding, decisions. Thus, if the 
EU member states can be viewed as the principals then 
organizations like the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice are their agents. Garrett used the 
PA analysis in a very restrictive way to depict the CJEU as 
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an institution that almost lacks autonomy.46 A relatively 
extensive description of the role that the Court of Justice 
enjoys in EU legal integration in terms of the ‘principal-
agent’ theory is provided by Jonas Tallberg who produced 
some reasonable research on the European Court of 
Justice’s decision making constraints. One of the primary 
merits of P-A analysis, as Tallberg argues, is its open-ended 
character, thus allowing for nuanced, empirical 
assessments of the scope for supranational influence.47 The 
Principal-Agent paradigm does not seem to address 
efficiently the fact that the agents are not mere instruments 
but have independent preferences and might have their 
own political agenda. Intergovernmental arguments are 
thus not necessarily in contradiction with rational 
institutionalism which acknowledges the reality of having 
the CJEU considering extra-legal factors and political 
power especially in cases where the institutions interests 
might be involved in the long run. In the end it is the 
member states that can change the Treaty and thus the 
form and the functions that the Court exercises. In other 
words the Court is in a relationship of interdependence 
with the principals that have established it. And the 
                                                 
46
Garrett, Geoffrey. International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The 
European Community‟s Internal Market. International Organization, Vol. 46, 
No. 2, 1992.  
47
 Tallberg, Jonas. Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and 
the Principle of State Liability. Journal of European Public Policy, 7:1, 2001. 
 
50 
 
approach of the intergovernmentalists does not capture the 
fact that the Court is a rational actor in this game which 
realizes that the principals are also dependent on its 
existence as the member states cannot do without the 
power of judiciary in the alliance that they formed. 
 
Burrley and Mattli produced a seminal paper in 1993 in 
which they find the neofunctional approach a plausible 
one. Claiming that legal integration has been actually 
engineered by the Court they agree that the ‚judges 
working in Luxembourg managed to transform the Treaty 
of Rome into a constitution.‛48 In addition Burrley (now 
Slaughter) and Mattli’s theory pointed out several ways in 
which the Court might be used to respond to the interests 
of different private actors rather than those of some 
member state. These groups include traders, large 
producers or transnational companies. Thus, as 
neofunctionalists would argue, the spill-over effect of more 
litigation would lead to more references to the Court which 
in turn will expand the domain of EU law, closing this 
vicious circle by leading to even more litigation. Mattli and 
Slaughter confirm these views in their reply to Garret in 
1995.49 It is rather naïve to believe that the Court could not 
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be hindered in the process of constitutionalizing the treaties 
or increasing the scope of its competences. In the end it was 
the supreme courts of the member states that adopted the 
legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy to help this 
legal integration penetrate within their national law 
systems. Neofunctionalists would probably find no 
evidence for their arguments from the CJEU judgments if 
Cassis de Dijon and Van Gend En Loos were not to happen 
so early in the Court’s case-law. It is the theoretical 
background of historical institutionalism and its concepts 
of path dependency and critical junctures that explain 
better the always ongoing conflict between national and EU 
law. The mechanics of this process will be observed in 
further detail in Chapter V, where it will be revealed that 
the legal integration has its limits and the Court of Justice is 
not a simple push button of neofunctional determinism but 
is rather a rational agent which needs to assess the extent to 
which it may act in accordance to the member state’s 
approval of extra integration. It is the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz controversial issue that is the word of fashion 
in the Court’s struggle to turn the treaties into a 
constitution and it seems that we are still to witness 
another famous judgment in this context that historical 
neoinstitutionalists will label as a critical juncture that will 
define EU legal integration in the long run.  
 
In his later works Geoffrey Garrett retreats from his 
originally extreme positions as he argues that indeed the 
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member states, especially the economically strongest ones, 
frequently choose not to argue against the Court’s decisions 
for the cost of doing this is often higher than the inevitable 
benefits that these decisions bring as well.5051 Thus, as the 
Court is aware of this reasoning of the national 
governments, it acts as a strategic rational actor which 
understands its limits. Its primary objective as an 
institution is to expand the domain of European law and 
therefore its authority to interpret it. However, the Court 
realizes that its power is not simply given by the wording 
of the treaties, but rather came as a function of member 
states’ interests through the legislation they adopted and it 
is exactly these governments that can change the status 
quo. Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla as well argue that the 
capacity of the CJEU to influence member state behavior is 
highly constrained52 but their initial results are somehow 
dubious and triggered controversial reactions. An year 
later, in 2010, Carrubba and Gabel published a revised 
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version of their test of the neofunctionalist arguments.53 
Garrett’s turn from the conservative views of 
intergovernmentalism is exactly a retreat to the rational 
institutionalist ideas that an institution needs to take into 
account the factors that might alter its functioning and is 
acting accordingly whenever necessary. This gives a face of 
the Court of Justice and in the next chapter I am going to 
prove that the Court has been more tolerant and sensitive 
to the actions of the states that have the real power to 
modify the treaties and the overall institutional framework 
in the European Union.  
 
The existing literature has dealt surprisingly little with the 
internal structure, organization and procedures in the 
Court as a factor in its judicial decision making. In fact I am 
aware of a single paper that is focused on this matter.54 
There are a number of issues in this context that may well 
further the policy preferences of certain involved actors to 
an extent in which potentially these could influence the 
Court’s rulings. Such extra-legal circumstances include the 
CJEU judges and Advocate Generals appointments by their 
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respective national governments, the internal distribution 
of cases to the Advocate Generals and the Judge 
Rapporteurs, as well as the consequent composition of the 
Court that will actually provide the final judgment. In this 
thesis it is my intention to investigate whether similar 
institutional constraints concerning the CJEU have been 
exploited strategically by justices and/or member states to 
achieve certain policy goals and the extent to which such 
extra-legal variables are a significant part of the equation of 
the Court’s decision making will be assessed in Chapter IV 
of this thesis. 
 
The procedures within the CJEU as well as the special 
positions of the Advocate Generals, Judge Rapporteurs and 
judges in general imply a potential tool that member states 
may exploit through their appointments. In a 1998 paper 
Kenney finds no pattern of appointment politics or an 
indication that CJEU judges are assigned in the context of 
some political factors.55 In this paper I will run another test 
to confirm these findings. Apart from the nationalities of 
the justices I included information on the seniority of the 
Advocate Generals and the Judge Rapporteurs, as well as 
the number of judges deciding each particular case, which 
may serve to control for the theoretical expectations of 
collegiality as a factor of judicial decision making. As 
Edwards puts it: ‘The more collegial the court, the more 
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likely it is that the cases that come before it will be 
determined on their legal merits’56. In his seminal paper 
Edwards poses his views that the levels of collegiality are 
higher in smaller courts as smaller groups have the 
potential to interact more efficiently. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union is certainly a Court in which you 
would expect high intensity of personal relationships that 
would trigger more easily the occurrence of differing views 
which lie at the heart of what appellate justice is about.57  
 
On the other hand one should also consider all other non-
procedural but still relevant legal issues that could alter the 
outcome of the Court’s ruling. Such factors predetermine 
the overall case complexity which will be defined later in 
this dissertation in terms of the number of legal matters 
involved in each particular case as well as the certain legal 
provision that is at stake. An empirical study on the impact 
of case complexity in the US Supreme Court suggests that 
this factor significantly increases the likelihood of opinion 
writing. In other words the judges refrained more often 
from writing dissents in cases with fewer legal provisions 
and issues.58 The decision making process in the CJEU, 
however, does not provide for the option of issuing 
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concurrent opinions and we have no access to information 
on the secret vote of the judges. In any case the focus on the 
institution as a separate entity that is not acting under the 
guidance and the expectations of the member states is 
again present to support the approach of institutionalism to 
the Court’s decision making.  
 
It has to be pointed out that solely extra-legal issues were 
rarely found to explain the variation of any Court rulings. 
As George & Epstein conclude: ‘<the most complete 
explanation of judicial outcomes should incorporate legal 
and extra-legal factors. Seen in this light, the views of 
neither the classical legal thinkers nor the behavioralists are 
incorrect; but they are incomplete. Both law and politics 
play significant roles in the Supreme Court’s decision-
making process.’59 Therefore, a complete understanding of 
judicial behavior must include both legal and extra-legal 
factors. The main objective of this paper however is not to 
create a model that will predict the rulings of the CJEU but 
simply to contribute to our understanding of the institution 
by testing its reaction towards a set of factors that should 
not predetermine any part of the outcome in ideal 
circumstances.  
 
After all the Court can only rule on cases that were brought 
in front of it. Therefore the decision to refer a case to the 
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CJEU is inevitably an essential factor in European legal 
integration. For this reason anticipating the judicial 
outcome is crucial for the costs that the Court’s decisions 
might cause. As in any national legal system, citizens have 
opinions over how decisions should be made. These 
opinions matter to courts because the more the weight of 
public opinion is against a particular decision, the greater 
the cost to the court’s legitimacy if it chooses to make that 
decision60. This hypothesis has been tested not only for the 
Court of Justice rulings61 but also for the national courts’ 
decisions to refer a case to the CJEU62. The evidence and the 
findings of the authors is consistent with the idea that 
judges take into account public opinion as they function 
under a considerable legitimacy constraint. In 1995 
Caldeira and Gibson also published a quantitative analysis 
on the effect of public opinion towards the CJEU in which 
they find that in general this opinion is shaped mostly by 
how one feels about the EU in general63. These findings 
come to support a rational neo-institutionalist argument 
that the Court of Justice, as a traditional political 
institution, is an actor taking into account the rules of a 
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strategic game, featured by exogenous preferences, that can 
be modeled around the constant strive of the Court, as an 
agent, to pursue its own institutional agenda within the 
constraints set by the member states (the principals) that 
characterize its ultimate function – namely to apply the law 
that the principals adopted. 
 
In this ‘CJEU vs. member states’ permanent contest the 
national governments compliance with the Court’s 
decisions is of obvious significance. Therefore, the area of 
legislation that has been concerned by the CJEU rulings is 
to be considered in its respective national circumstances as 
well. In a study that measured the factors behind the 
implementation of the Court’s decisions Nyikos found 
statistical significance in her independent variables to 
conclude that ‘The higher the certainty about judicial 
decision-making, the more likely litigants are voluntarily to 
implement CJEU decisions, thereby cutting the costs they 
incur by awaiting a domestic ruling. In other words, the 
less perceived room there is for novel or evasive 
interpretation on the part of the national court, the more 
likely litigants are to desist’64. These findings suggest that 
national court’s legitimacy is also at stake and all judicial 
decision-makers are likely to take into account their mutual 
institutional constraints whenever they have the 
opportunity to rationalize their strategies. In 2003 Carrubba 
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applied his model of judicial institutions to demonstrate 
that ‘public perceptions of institutional legitimacy are 
critical to the EU legal system being able to act as an 
effective democratic check’65. If public opinion about the 
CJEU is such an essential factor then it goes without saying 
that member states compliance with the Court’s decisions is 
a crucial interest of the Court as it is the most visible and 
convincing course through which it can establish its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. Nyikos and 
Carrubba conclusions fit within the rational 
institutionalism paradigm of the principal-agent theory in 
which the Court of Justice of the European Union is 
expected to attempt maximizing its own utilities within the 
system of rules into which it has been set.  This is of course 
the main assumption of new institutionalism as well, as its 
theoretical expectation is that the Court is first and 
foremost interested in its own survival and the origin of its 
legitimacy in the easy of the sovereigns  is an inseparable 
part of this pursuit. 
 
Non-compliance with the Court’s rulings for infringement 
(ex art.226 ECT) is explained in a different manner by two 
competing theories. The supporters of the management 
theory argue that not complying is involuntarily and is 
caused simply by the lack of capacity of the member states 
to implement properly and timely the European rules. The 
alternative theory, the so-called enforcement approach, 
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claims that there is a voluntary decision of the member 
state that is a function of its power vis-à-vis the 
supranational European institutions. Boerzel, Hofmann 
and Panke actually find that these theories are rather 
complementary and not exclusive66. In any case it will be 
naïve to believe that the Court ignores totally the costs that 
some (or all) member states would have to pay as a 
consequence of its rulings. Practically all of the findings 
cited in the papers that deal with compliance of EU law 
imply that the CJEU is destined to function as a strategic 
political actor if it wants to move on with its own 
institutional agenda which is another expectation of the 
rational choice institutionalism. 
 
On the other hand, a good descriptive analysis on the 
mechanisms and the strategies that national governments 
might take into account in their approach towards the 
Court of Justice can be found in Granger’s paper of 200667. 
In fact national courts have been often found to act 
strategically by submission of preemptive opinions during 
the initial stage of referral to the CJEU as an attempt to 
influence how the final interpretation will sound68. As 
Panke argues: ‘Owing to the high organizational degree of 
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societal norm opponents in the field of social policy, 
governments consider domestic costs as more important 
than costs induced from above’69. Therefore, by the very 
decision to send a case to Luxembourg, national 
institutions by default cause a selection bias at least within 
the preliminary ruling procedure (it allows member state 
courts to choose whether to apply European rules or to ask 
the Court of Justice for their interpretation). The causal 
relationships between the litigants, the national courts and 
the CJEU makes the perspective of the public choice 
methodology fit the European legal integration 
conveniently as it takes into account the motives of all 
actors to advance their own political preferences. Thus, 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are two 
opposite extremes which would be valid only under 
restrictive circumstances70. Another important finding was 
provided in 2005 by Carrubba and Gable who tested how 
the observations submitted by member states to express 
and defend their preferences influence the outcomes of the 
Court’s cases. Their results indicate strongly that the Court 
is constrained by this political influence and even 
distinguish between legal and extra-legal methods of 
constraints to which the Court of Justice is found to 
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respond71. In any case the problem of selection bias which 
is inevitable whenever a large-N of preliminary reference 
cases are analyzed statistically makes it inappropriate to 
apply quantitative methodology. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the CJEU case-law involving 
preliminary rulings will be restricted to those very few of 
them that settled the core principles of EU law. As I will try 
to reveal later, these fit well the expectations of historical 
institutionalism serving as ‘critical junctures’ that 
predetermine a consequent ‘path dependency’ also through 
their self-reinforcing feature as legal precedents. 
 
Probably the most notable name in the camp of the neo-
functionalists is that of Alec Stone Sweet who in a series of 
papers with his collaborators (Stone Sweet and Brunell 
1998a and 1998b, Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998, Stone 
Sweet 1999, Stone Sweet and Fligstein 2002, Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz 2010, Stone Sweet 2010) consistently argues 
that the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
promoted supranational norms at the expense of national 
laws. Most importantly Stone and Brunell argue that legal 
integration occurred because it was driven by the increased 
transnational business interests within the Union. By using 
econometric methods Stone Sweet and Brunell manipulate 
a dataset of observations to find that a rise in transnational 
activity leads to the rise in preliminary referrals, and that 
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transnational activity is simultaneously activated by the 
consequent consolidation of legislation72. Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz’s 1997 paper is in fact the introduction of the 
currently leading paradigm in European integration which 
relies on three causal factors – exchange, organization and 
rules73. Stone Sweet and Brunell practically reaffirm the 
same views by presenting the integration process as a 
constitution of three causal factors: transnational exchange, 
dispute resolution and legislation. Their theory suggests 
that in case the causal links among these three factors are 
hindered, the legal system intervenes according to a self-
sustaining and expansionary dynamic74. Stone Sweet 
restated this formulation later as well: ‘European 
integration is driven by a self-reinforcing causal system 
involving trading, litigation, legislation and lobbying75. 
Thus, the expectations of Stone Sweet of a self-perpetuating 
cycle seem to be in agreement to those of the historical 
institutionalists who would argue that the process of 
European legal integration is a classic example of path 
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dependency that the Court of Justice managed to establish 
in the first decades of its functioning.  
 
It has not been longer than 10 years that scholars started 
testing empirically their theories of European legal 
integration with the help of serious quantitative and 
statistical analysis. In 1999 Stone Sweet and Brunell 
codified the case-law of the Court of Justice in a database. 
This otherwise exhaustive database however does not 
provide in-depth information on the actual outcome of the 
Court’s rulings. Neither does it distinguish between the 
content or the significance of the cases apart form the legal 
procedure that was followed and the actual area of 
legislation that each case concerns (free movement of 
persons, approximation of laws, etc.).  
 
Soon after Stone Sweet and Brunell published their 
hypothesis a certain number of scholars started testing it 
empirically by providing evidence from the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Up until recently, 
however, practically all relevant research either referred to 
a concrete area of legislation or, if it involved purely 
quantitative methods, allowed for significant selection bias, 
preventing occurrence of the appropriate variation to be 
examined. In the next chapter of this thesis I will try to deal 
with this problem by limiting the analysis to the annulment 
action cases only, however the cases of preliminary rulings 
which constitute the most crucial decisions and the main 
legal doctrines of the Court can hardly be analyzed 
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statistically in an adequate manner for the purpose of this 
study and I have therefore decided to address some of 
them on a case by case basis in the fifth chapter of the thesis 
as they have set the principles that the CJEU abides by in a 
way that historical institutionalists will define as path 
dependent.  
 
The Institutionalists 
In her 1998 paper Karen Alter, one of the most prominent 
scholar studying the Court of Justice, examined the 
institutional constraints of CJEU-member states relations. 
Her conclusion implies that domestic politics influences 
European integration and governments do not oppose the 
Court’s rulings unless these bear some short-term costs. 
The Court of Justice, being fully aware of this status quo, is 
thus found to be a rational actor that designs its strategy 
accordingly76. Later Alter kept observing the degree to 
which member states got involved in the legal integration 
or rather constitutionalization of Europe. She found that 
some of the variables that predetermine member states’ 
actions in relation to the Court are national legal education, 
the litigiousness of individual societies, the strategic 
behavior of national judges and inter-court competition.77 78 
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These findings again match the rational choice 
institutionalists assumption that the central actors in the 
political process are utility-maximizing actors, driven by 
their self-interest and preferences, and institutions not only 
emerge and survive as a result of these actors 
interdependence but also become a subjective agent in the 
political processes once they start functioning.79  
 
In a 1998 paper that examines all CJEU rulings regarding 
environmental legal issues Cichowski provides evidence 
that supports the neo-functionalist theories. The Court of 
Justice is found to act to fuel the European integration 
process having decided often against the interests of the 
most powerful member states. As Cichowski argues: ‚The 
relationship between the national courts and the Court of 
Justice lead to the creation of new European laws. This 
construction of supranational policy undermines national 
control over particular policy decisions‛80. Observing the 
essence of the content of all environmental cases that the 
CJEU dealt with, Cichowski found out that one of the main 
conflict is that of national environmental regulations that 
hinder European free trade priorities. Examining the 
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Court’s response in these cases the author reached the 
following conclusion: ‚Judicial rulings either actively 
dismantled national environmental regulations which 
presented a clear obstruction to free trade; or the rulings 
led to the construction of a supranational legal framework 
to balance environmental protection and economic 
interests‛81. Evidently in both ways the Court has actually 
expanded supranational authority which is the evident 
expectation of rational institutionalism and its own 
institutional interests of survival and power. Cichowski 
reached similar conclusions in a paper that used the role of 
the CJEU in regards to women rights as another example 
which affirms the neoinstitutionalist paradigm. As the 
author argues: ‘Supranational constitutionalism has led to 
both the expansion of EU law and the opportunity for 
social groups to bring claims against their own 
governments and dismantle discriminatory national 
practices’82. 
 
Margaret McCown is probably the only scholar that 
examined the significance of precedents in European law. 
McCown argues that precedents get institutionalized and 
even set the context of future European legislation as treaty 
revisions have been often found to be influenced by the 
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CJEU case-law83. McCown denies the findings of Garret et 
al (1998) and proofs that legal argumentation is crucial for 
judicial integration. She provides quantitative evidence that 
precedents in European law matter and they progressively 
structure outcomes. Moreover, McCown believes that 
making precedent-based decisions gives advantage to the 
Court because it enables other parties to argue in terms of 
precedents and the use of Court’s interpretation to justify 
their positions84. The opportunity of demonstrating 
consistency throughout the decision making processes is 
delivered comfortably for any judicial institution by 
referring to precedents in its case-law. The idea of having 
precedents that a Court follows in its subsequent rulings 
can well serve to fit the notion of ‘path dependency’ which, 
as the historical institutionalists would argue, 
predetermines certain patterns of an institution’s further 
behavior and decision making.  
 
Pitarakis and Tridimas also tested quantitatively the 
neofunctional arguments that trade and references to the 
CJEU are in a mutual dependency and progressively cause 
each other. In the analysis they published in 2003 they 
confirmed ‘a causal link that runs from references per 
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capita to the ration of intra-EU trade to GDP’85. However, 
their findings did not support the same causal link in the 
opposite direction. In fact Carrubba and Gabel reach the 
same conclusion after they run a quite rigorous test on the 
impact that pro-liberalizing CJEU rulings have on trade86. 
Their regression reveals a significant positive correlation 
which supports the argument of Stone Sweet and Brunell. 
However, they also do not find the expected reverse effect 
of trade on Court’s decisions. This progressive 
interdependence between a member state’s trade within the 
Union and its national courts’ references to the court in 
Luxembourg is a sign that, since the CJEU established itself 
as an effective institution and an essential decision-maker, 
the national courts stared considering European law as 
another instrument to pursue their own institutional 
interests. The inertia of this self-inforcing system is a clear 
example of the path dependency expectation on which 
historical institutionalists stress when explaining the 
constraints that institutional factors impose in the political 
processes.  
 
In a series of publications (2006, 2008, 2010) Daniel 
Kelemen introduces the concept of adversarial legalism to 
explain the long term evolution of the CJEU case-law and 
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the overall European governance. According to Kelemen 
‘adversarial legalism’, traditionally viewed as a uniquely 
American legal style, is ‚an approach of regulation through 
strict legalistic enforcement of detailed legal norms, relying 
on active judicial intervention and frequent private 
litigation‛ that is spreading in the European Union caused 
by the economic and political pressures that European 
integration unleashed87. Recently Alec Stone Sweet 
recognized Kelemen’s theory as one with the greatest 
potential and predicted that the introduction of the Charter 
of Human Rights within the competences of the European 
Union institutions will strengthen the dynamics of this 
adversarial legalism. In Stone Sweet’s opinion, if Kelemen 
is right this will result in further judicialization of the EU 
governance88. The evolution of the above mentioned legal 
norms and the timing of this active judicial intervention in 
the case of the CJEU can neatly be traced in the context of 
historical institutionalism concepts of path dependency and 
critical junctures. The moment when the Court decided to 
put forward a novel legal principle or to set an essential 
precedent. Historical institutionalism defines critical 
juncture as a moment in which contingent choices are made 
to set a certain pattern of institutional development and 
consolidation that is hard to reverse. In the following 
section I will observe the notions of EU law supremacy and 
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direct effect in this sense, as well as the development of the 
Court’s case-law that defined the freedoms of movement 
within the European Economic Area in legal terms. 
 
Recent studies concerning the legislative politics in 
European integration tend to avoid the 
intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism axis of debate. 
Leuffen and Hertz for example found strong statistical 
evidence that anticipation is a huge factor in policy-making 
for proving that member states fear the costs of 
enlargement. Their empirical analysis shows that legislative 
output increases before the accession of new member 
states89. This research did not concern the CJEU directly but 
the fact the legal integration seems to be influenced 
significantly by political factors, such as enlargement, is 
illustrative enough. If EU legislative institutions even 
respond to exogenous factors then the Court of Justice is 
likely to act accordingly as a rational agent in this system. 
To what extent the Court is a rational and political actor 
still remains to be answered. Grimmel introduced the 
concept of context rationality which for a researcher on the 
CJEU means that he should take into account the purely 
legal issues that the Court actually decides on. This concept 
is in line with the neoisntitutionalism and especially its 
rational choice subdivision. Rationality is of course limited 
and whether it is for the lack of complete information, the 
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amount of time that actors have to make a decision or some 
other constraints that disallow performing the most desired 
action one has to take into account the neoinstitutionalis 
concept of bounded rationality as in practice all institutions 
perform within certain limits. In fact the Court’s first and 
foremost purpose is to make sure that the law is obeyed. 
Thus, in Grimmel’s opinion we should explore the law 
itself before we try to understand integration through law 
as in most cases maybe the Court is just solving issues in a 
practical manner. By outlining this point Grimmel claims 
that judicial law making is not based solely on trivial and 
political rationality and can be understood appropriately 
only by paying attention to the context of European law90. 
 
Indeed the process of European integration is already far 
more than simply liberalizing trade and integrating 
markets. A big deal of issues sensitive to the member states 
have been Europeanized in the last decade or so. These 
include elements of social, health and monetary policies, 
rights of labor and even voting rights91. Therefore if in this 
sense the neofunctionalist paradigm is valid we have to 
expect that legal integration will impact the everyday life of 
the EU citizens more essentially in the nearest future. Thus, 
constructing a model of these processes with the central 
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role of the Court of Justice in it should help us understand 
and probably even anticipate the outcomes of European 
policy- and decision-making. Moreover, such a working 
model will be a useful tool in the hands of all actors 
involved in legislation at the EU level, as the struggle 
between the Commission and the member states on the 
way towards federalization of Europe is inevitable. In any 
case, as has been shown in this section, it seems that 
practically the findings in all essential studies devoted to 
the judicial activism of the CJEU can be viewed through the 
lenses of the traditional concepts of neoinstitutionalism. A 
further part of this thesis (Chapter V) is intended to 
demonstrate this from the perspective of historical 
institutionalism by conducting a deeper analysis of some of 
the most illustrative legal doctrines and rulings of the 
Court. There, in contrast to the quantitative analysis of 
annulment cases in the next chapter, I will follow a rather 
descriptive approach based on the judgments and legal 
principles that emerged in the CJEU case-law through the 
preliminary rulings procedure. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The Court of Justice and 
Rational Institutionalism: 
Evidence from a Novel 
Dataset 
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In this chapter I will try to test the argument that the Court 
of Justice of the European Union is acting as a rational 
agent taking into account extra-legal circumstances that lay 
beyond its original institutional purposes. Such a finding 
should support the views that new institutionalism is the 
most appropriate theoretical background that one should 
use to approach the CJEU and understand its decision 
making in the context of the internal institutional interests 
and agenda of the Court. The ultimate test that should 
illustrate that political conditions are taken into account in 
the judicial decision making of international law judges 
would be having the same Court treating certain countries 
or litigants more favorably than others in cases of similar 
character. This would be consequently explained in purely 
neoinstitutionalist arguments representing the judges as 
rational decision makers realizing their own and their 
institution’s interdependency and applying this non-legal 
dimension in their judgments.  
 
 
Methodology  
 
For the purpose of conducting an adequate test to check 
whether some extra-legal features were statistically 
significant as factors that influenced the judgments of the 
Court of Justice I rely on the methods of quantitative 
analysis. In short I will run several multivariate ordered 
logistic regressions having the decision of the Court as a 
dependent variable and different subsets of independent 
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variables that comprise of the above-mentioned factors. In 
order to perform such a task one should be extremely 
cautious to avoid the problems of selection bias or 
heterogeneity among observations. Otherwise the extent of 
correlation between the variables will be misleadingly 
biased. 
 
In general the objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it is 
an attempt to contribute to our understanding of judicial 
decision making by providing a quantitative analysis of a 
large dataset consisting of a certain relative part of the 
rulings from the case-law of the Court of Justice. This 
analysis would capture variables of both legal and extra-
legal character.  And, on the other hand, the findings of this 
research should shed light on the extent to which rational 
institutionalist arguments hold against neofunctionalism 
being a prominent theory of European integration that has 
so far served mostly to explain the Court’s judicial decision 
making. I can conveniently achieve both of the objectives 
simultaneously by running the same test as a big deal of the 
extra-legal variables actually imply exactly the claims that 
member state preferences are taken into account in the 
Court’s decisions. 
 
Case Selection 
 
There are several legal procedures through which an action 
can be brought in front of the Court of Justice. In fact 
almost all cases that the Court hears fall under the 
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following three procedures: actions for annulment, 
references for a preliminary ruling and actions for failure to 
fulfill obligations (infringement procedure). In a project 
that finished in 2008 Stone Sweet and Brunell collected an 
exhaustive database of all CJEU cases under these three 
procedures. Their dataset lists the cases chronologically 
and includes information on the litigants and the subject 
matter of each particular case. This is the first paper in 
which this dataset has been extended to add and codify all 
publicly available data about the corresponding ruling of 
the Court, Advocate General and his opinion, Judge 
Rapporteur, composition of the Court, number of referrals 
in consequent case-law, and the contested legal act.  
 
The treaties that the member states sign and all the EU 
secondary legislation evolving out of them are allegedly the 
paramount tool of European integration. Those are a 
subject of arduous negotiations often resulting in 
approving the version of wording that no one originally 
proposed but neither has someone opposed in the end of 
the day. Then, that lowest common denominator text is up 
to the Court of Justice to use in its rulings. Thus, as 
European law is frequently vague but at the same time 
concerns specific provisions, it is understandable why half 
of the cases brought in front of the Court are actually 
references for a preliminary ruling.  
 
Even though obviously all cases from the Court’s case-law 
bear certain information that may be processed to reveal 
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some of the potential patterns which the justices followed, 
for the purpose of the research, I decided to limit the 
dataset only to the applications for annulment cases. There 
are several reasons that justify this decision. The most 
obvious is the concern of avoiding potential selection bias. 
First, preliminary rulings are actually not even decisions 
per se but rather interpretation of the European legislation 
and as such can hardly be codified and consequently be a 
subject of quantitative analysis. Moreover, the source of 
these references are by default the national courts and there 
are good reasons to believe that national judicial authorities 
prefer to interpret the law within their internal national 
constraints as they usually have the option to do so. In fact 
it is known that several member states such as Sweden, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom often prefer not to make 
a reference even in cases where they should.92 What is even 
more the average duration for the preliminary ruling 
procedure is roughly 2 years and many courts are reluctant 
to wait for that long and would rather go with their own 
interpretation.93  
 
There is no doubt that the crucial CJEU judgments of 
highest political and legal significance were delivered 
through the preliminary rulings procedure. That is why it 
is not surprising that these are also the most well-known 
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and cited cases as the Court introduced some essential 
principles which often widened the scope of its 
competences and thus deepened European integration. 
However, a thorough and simultaneously meaningful 
quantitative analysis of a large number of observations of 
the preliminary rulings is an extremely difficult task even if 
the problem of selection bias could be avoided. In order to 
examine the potential extra-legal dimension of the Court’s 
approach towards these cases one should also be able to 
assess the specificities of the national law of each respective 
member state from which the reference for a preliminary 
ruling came. On the other hand, even if this could be done 
it would still be quite tricky to determine whether the 
Court’s interpretation actually served better the preferences 
of the member states or the long-term interests of the 
Community. In fact it is a regular practice of the Court to 
deliver interpretations that favor the national legislation in 
a particular case in parallel with such an argumentation 
that can be analogically invoked in the future in order to 
justify a much wider pro-European interpretation of the 
law at the dislike of the member states: 
 
‘A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine as a 
general principle, but suggest that it is subject to various 
qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it 
is should not be applied to the facts of the case before it. 
The principle, however, is now established. If there are not 
too many protests, it will be reaffirmed in later cases; the 
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qualifications can then be whittled away and the full text of 
the doctrine revealed.’94 
 
Infringement cases are another potential source of selection 
bias as the Commission is known to negotiate terms with 
the member states that have failed to fulfill their 
obligations. This means that the set of cases that will enter 
the Court under this procedure could be predetermined in 
advance by certain criteria that are a result of these 
negotiations. Moreover, it could be assumed that the 
Commission anyway does not initiate an infringement 
procedure at every potential occasion, not only for the lack 
of sufficient capacity to monitor entirely the compliance of 
all obligations that member states have agreed to fulfill, but 
also as it is aware of its chances to do it successfully in the 
Court. If this is the case this would of course alter 
significantly the results of any intended test. In the end the 
treaty is also quite restrictive as to who may bring whom in 
the context of this procedure and, even though it implies 
incidents of a direct clash between national and 
supranational interests, it is limited to conflicts between the 
member states and the Commission. 
 
Thus, I am left with the actions for annulment which I 
believe are anyway the most appropriate cases providing 
the ideal laboratory environment for the envisaged test. 
The annulment cases represent the Court’s solutions to 
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specific problems in which the rulings can be easily read in 
terms of national vs. supranational actors success. It is not 
surprising that these are the cases which are least studied 
in the literature as they bear a lower long-term legal 
significance. However, they are the ideal starting point for 
any quantitative analysis of the CJEU as an institution and 
one of the objectives of this paper is to fill this gap as well. 
In fact to the best of my knowledge there is a single paper 
in which annulments were examined to uncover certain 
patterns that these cases generally followed.95 As Bauer & 
Hartlapp claim in it: 
 
‘Notwithstanding the role annulments have played in 
selected case studies, there is no interpretative overview, let 
alone systematic attempt to analyze annulment actions at 
the aggregate level as a particular set of cases in their own 
right.’ 
 
Bauer and Hartlapp managed to depict some of the 
tendencies regarding the evolution of the number of 
annulment cases by year, by state or by area but their 
research did not go further to elaborate on the actual 
rulings as it was not focused on the Court as an institution 
at all. In fact the authors are looking into ‘the driving forces 
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of policy-related conflict between national and 
supranational actors’ and thus, on the reasons that trigger a 
certain actor to initiate an annulment action. Whereas the 
evident objective of this paper is to look into the judgments 
in these cases as a catalyst in which some potential features 
intrinsic to the European Court of Justice decision-making 
may have revealed.  
 
Dataset 
 
This chapter is based on a dataset including all the 1102 
actions of annulment cases that were brought in front of 
Court of Justice between 1954 and 2005 and ruled on by a 
judgment of the Court. In this original dataset the Court’s 
decision is coded as 0 if the applicant was not successful, 1 
if it got a partial success in the case, and 2 if it the Court 
ruled in its favor. This is also the dependent variable used 
in the statistical analysis. All data was gathered manually 
using the EUR-Lex site maintained by the Publications 
Office of the European Union.96  
 
All publicly accessible information has been used to create 
variables of factors for which there are theoretical grounds 
to suppose they could explain the variation of the Court’s 
judgments. These control variables are divided into three 
groups depending on their temporal occurrence regarding 
the procedural phase of the case. The pre-procedural 
factors include those variables that are present at the 
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moment of registering the case. These include information 
about the litigants, the year in which the case was brought 
in, the number of legal matters involved, the legal area at 
stake, as well as the measure contested for annulment. The 
second group concerns the procedural stage in which the 
actual justices deal with the annulment action. The coded 
data into these variables comprises the seniority of the 
assigned to each case Advocate Generals and the Judge 
Rapporteurs, as well as their nationality and the 
composition of the Court. The post-procedural variables 
consist of information about the duration of the cases and 
their significance measured in terms of further referrals in 
the subsequent case-law, and the number of citations in all 
community legal documents issued by the end of 2010.  
 
Descriptive Data and Analysis 
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The number of annulment actions has gradually increased 
over time together with the widening of the competences of 
the community but also because of the Union’s waves of 
enlargement. The number of successful applications 
however has been pretty much constant throughout the 
decades at a rate of about 25% of success in cases where the 
applicants were national actors (individuals or member 
state governments) and the European institutions, most 
often the Commission, had to defend the validity of the 
contested legal measure. For the purpose of completeness I 
have included all annulment actions in the dataset. Still, 
later in the statistical analysis I drop the inter-institutional 
cases as these do not represent an actual conflict between 
the national interests and those of the Community.  The 
following table is illustrative for the distribution of the 
cases based on the types of applicants and their success.  
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The third column consists of the inter-institutional cases 
which are not included in the regression analysis for the 
significance of all tested variables. Not surprisingly the 
overall picture reveals that the national claims are rarely 
victorious as the Court dismisses the annulment actions 
against the Community institutions in more than 70% of 
the cases.  
 
Interestingly the majority of cases concern a short list of 
legal domains with more than half of the annulment actions 
regarding the areas of agriculture and competition. Bauer 
and Hartlapp claim that putting money into the centre of 
attention is expected for having economic interest as a good 
indictor of conflict emergence. They present the thesis that 
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agriculture and competition are most often involved as it is 
money distribution that lies at the heart of these policies. In 
any event, it has to be taken into account that the results of 
the analysis of annulment cases concern a limited set of 
policies and, even though the effect of each different legal 
area will be controlled for, all results should be viewed 
within this context. 
 
 
 
There are certain rules that govern the conditions under 
which an individual is allowed to bring an annulment case 
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in front of the Court of JusticeJ97 and that is why a 
considerable deal of the applications coming from 
individuals are not successful simply for being 
inadmissible. This can partly explain why in general having 
a member state as an applicant is a significant factor 
predetermining the chances of having a winning 
annulment case. Thus, a deeper analysis within the 
category of member states applicants is needed in order to 
test for the potential political impact that certain states 
might have over CJEU judgments. A look at the policies 
that member states most usually refer to as applicants 
when they try to void a certain piece of legislation reveals 
that agriculture is a common area of interest, whereas 
competition is practically never an issue of conflict for the 
Nordic and the non-continental (UK and Ireland) states. 
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There is a very important assumption that has to be made 
before going into the analysis of applicants' success within 
the group of member states. And that is that each of the 
member states has enough capacity to provide for the 
optimal legal presentation of its side in the case. Even 
though this seems to be an evident fact it still has to be 
pointed as otherwise one may argue that it is for the lack of 
resources that some member states are less successful in 
Court.  
 
Even though in general the Court of Justice rules in favor of 
a member state in less than a third of the annulment 
actions, the arguments of intergovernmentalists, and thus 
of rational institutionalism, that member states interests are 
a factor in the Court’s decision-making may still hold if 
justices are found to favor certain states significantly more 
often than others. To test for such a potential impact I 
generated a dummy variable to account for the three most 
powerful EU member states (Germany, France and UK) 
which are also the states that are traditionally the biggest 
net contributors towards the overall EU budget. The 
following table also implies that the usual net contributors 
are more likely to win an annulment case in the Court. 
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Test Results 
 
Pre-procedural stage:  
 
Before the investigation of the impact that all available 
different legal and extra-legal variables had over the final 
decisions of the Court in the database of all 1102 annulment 
actions in the 1954-2005 period it is worth mentioning that 
applicants are fully or partially successful just in some 
29.78% of the cases (the number of interinstitutional cases is 
not included here). It is indeed true that the states had 
better success (34.7%) compared to private organizations or 
individuals (26.5%). The best predictor of the decision is of 
course the opinion of the Advocate General for the 
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respective case as the Court has been recorded to follow it 
in some 80% of all cases which is true not only for the 
present dataset of annulment actions but for the other type 
of cases as well. 
 
The opinion of the Advocate General in its essence looks 
very much alike the wording of the final ruling that the 
Court will issue. However, it is characterized by two 
features which have to be taken into account for the 
purposes of this project. First, it is not anonymous - it is 
prepared by a certain Advocate General whose name is 
publicly available for each of the cases at stake. Thus, the 
amount of personal responsibility differs when compared 
to the rulings of the Court for which we never know 
whether some of the judges were reluctant to agree to or 
not. Second, the Advocate General is well aware that his 
opinion is a subject of revision and eventual change. In 
other words, in cases which assume alternative approaches 
that may alter the final decision in either way, the Advocate 
Generals have the option to either be a bit balder knowing 
that in the end it is the judges that will have the final say, or 
to partially alleviate the pressure that would be otherwise 
transferred fully to the judges by suggesting a decision that 
is more favorable to the applicants in the more sensitive 
cases in which the interests of the bigger member states are 
usually involved.  
 
The following table reveals that the Advocate Generals are 
not likely to discriminate between member state and non-
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member state applicants. However, within the group if 
cases in which the applicant has been a member state, the 
opinions of the Advocate Generals are found to be 
positively and statistically significantly correlated with the 
power of the member state involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is totally in line with the expectations of rational 
choice institutionalism which would present the Court as a 
rational actor considering the powers of these internal 
actors (the bigger member states in this case) that are 
capable of changing the scope of the institution's 
competences.  The Advocate Generals are by default 
anyway usually nationals of the bigger member states and 
they would also be aware that the Court will be a subject of 
more severe criticism if it does not follow the opinion of the 
Advocate General especially if the case at stake is more 
sensitive for one or some of the bigger member states. 
Dependent 
variable: 
Opinion in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
      
 
  
State 0.226 
(1.56) 
 
 
        
Big State 
 
 0.498** 
(2.14) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.0021 0.0098         
Number of 
observations 
947 367         
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Of course the above mentioned observation has to be 
controlled for against the final decisions of the Court of 
Justice as well. The following table comes to convince us 
that it is not only the opinions but also the final rulings that 
seem to follow the same pattern. The first regression is a 
simple quantification of the well known fact that the 
decisions of the judges and the opinions of the Advocate 
Generals are positively correlated with a very large degree 
of statistical significance. What is more interesting 
however, is the fact the Court’s rulings are in a direct 
positive and statistically significant correlation with the 
dummy variable ‘state’ (1 if the applicant is a member state 
and 0 if otherwise) no matter whether we have controlled 
for the opinion of the Advocate General (regression II) or 
not (regression IV). This is not the case if we focus on the 
group within which all the cases actually have member 
states as applicants. The comparison between regression III 
and regression V reveals that the statistical significance in 
cases involving the big member states is lost once we 
control for the opinion of the Advocate Generals in these 
cases. But from the previous table we know that this 
opinion is positively correlated with the presence of a big 
member state as an applicant. In other words the judges are 
found to have followed the Advocate Generals when their 
opinions were in favor of big member state applicants.    
 
The finding that the Court seems to discriminate between 
member state and non-member state applicants regardless 
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of the opinion of the Advocate General is an indicator that 
the judges are most likely to ignore this opinion in the cases 
where it was not in favor of the member state applicants. 
This observation needs further attention as it is interesting 
enough to look for the potential reasons for this pattern. A 
possible explanation would be that the Court is sensitive to 
the member states reactions once the Advocate General has 
issued his opinion against their applications. If these 
reactions constitute the possible emergence of consequent 
behavior that would threaten the institutional preferences 
of the Court (for example in case the bigger member states 
involve into debates on the role of the judiciary) than the 
judges might me more likely to ignore the opinions and 
rule in favor to the member state instead. Such an 
explanation is of course speculative if not tested for the 
impact of political reaction to Advocate Generals opinions. 
Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge such a 
database has not been yet gathered or announced. 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 I II                III             IV        
 
 
   V 
 
Opinion of 
Advocate 
General 
1.809*** 
(14.65) 
 
 
 
 
1.813*** 
(14.66) 
1.869*** 
(8.78) 
     
State  0.388*** 
(2.74) 
 0.465** 
(2.52) 
      
Big State 
 
  0.540** 
(2.41) 
 0.290 
(0.95) 
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Legal matters  
 
Only 8.55% of the 983 cases in the database which represent 
a conflict between national and community interests over 
an action for annulment concern a single legal matter. The 
literature suggests that the issue of complexity is a potential 
factor in judicial decision making. The rationale behind this 
hypothesis is that issues which are legally harder to decide 
are less likely to lead to a ruling that will change the status 
quo. In this context the annulment action cases are again a 
very suitable basis for analysis. Of course the complexity of 
cases is an abstract concept which is not easy to quantify. 
For the purpose of this dissertation I have decided that the 
number of legal matters involved in each of the cases in the 
database can serve as a relatively good proxy.  
 
It is self evident that an issue concerning for example 
competition, free movement and external policy at the 
same time should be one of a higher legal complexity 
compared to another issue in which only competition is 
involved. In any case we have no other publicly available 
indicator at hand that can enable the intended quantitative 
analysis. The results however imply that complexity 
(expressed in the number of legal matters involved in a 
Overall R-
squared 
0.3165 0.0063 0.0114 0.3219 0.3293      
Number of 
observations 
944 977 392 944 366      
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case) does not seem to impact significantly the rulings in 
the case of the Court of Justice.  
 
 
Case year  
 
Another observation that the dataset allows to be 
performed is a test of the applicants’ success in annulment 
actions over the course of time. I have used the consecutive 
case year as an independent variable in an attempt to track 
a potential pattern in the balance of the Court’s decisions 
for and against the applicants. Of course it has to be said 
that the number of cases has steadily grown with each new 
decade. Not surprisingly, however, there is practically no 
correlation which implies that the Court has been stable in 
its approach during the years. This of course is a rather 
weak statement as it lies on two assumptions that have to 
be provided. Firstly, that the cases for annulment actions 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in favor 
of applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.809*** 
(14.65) 
 
 
        
Legal Matters 
 
0.016 
(0.20) 
-0.024 
(-0.39) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3165 0.0001         
Number of 
observations 
944 977         
96 
 
have also followed a pattern of steady and predictable 
applications which were relatively similar in their chances 
to be successful in the Court. And secondly, that the judges 
would of course be a subject of any extra-legal impact in 
their judicial decision making. The latter assumption is in 
line with the theoretical background of new 
institutionalism and at the same time has been tested and 
confirmed at several occasions in this dissertation. On the 
other hand we cannot say the same for the former 
assumption, and this is an interesting field for further 
research. Indeed, the Court is able to deal only with the 
applications that are brought in front of it and there is no 
mechanism that guarantees that all occasions of 
controversial community actions, decisions or legislation 
will be attacked in Court. 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.809*** 
(14.66) 
 
 
        
Case Year 
 
0.003 
(0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3166 0.0000         
Number of 
observations 
944 977         
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Annulment measure  
 
The majority of annulment cases (644 out of the 1102 in the 
dataset) have been applications for making void a certain 
decision taken at the Community level such as an imposed 
fee or some legislative act different from a directive or a 
regulation which I have as separate categories of the 
'anullment' variable in the quantitative analysis. 
Interestingly enough directives are rarely contested (27 
cases). Just as actions objecting the admissibility of a given 
case which account for some 14 of all annulment action 
cases. On the other hand appeals (222 cases) and 
regulations (195) represent an essential share of the 
legislative measures that were brought before the Court of 
Justice. The appeals are a more recent practice as the Court 
of First Instance (the judgments of which are the actual acts 
that the applicants appeal against) was established in 1989.  
 
The ordered multivariate logistic regression shows that in 
general the impact of the respective category of contested 
legislative measure is not so significant. Moreover this 
effect, if any, seems to be present in the initial phase of the 
case as it is the Advocate Generals opinions that take the 
statistical significance when included in the equation. Still, 
it is worth mentioning that appeals and regulations have 
some indications of being harder to annul as they are 
negatively correlated with the Court's rulings even though 
this effect is significant only at the 10% level of confidence 
in testing the null hypothesis. 
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It is hardly surprising that the Court of First Instance 
judgments are less likely to be ignored by the Court of 
Justice. As about regulations – these are such norms of 
legislation that are immediately binding and enforceable in 
all member states. Thus, they differ from directives which 
have to be transposed into national law, whereas 
regulations are self-executable and do not require 
additional implementing measures. In other words 
directives are less strict by default for their feature of letting 
the member states deliberate on the methods through 
which they will be implemented in their respective national 
legal systems. So this observation can hardly support 
essentially the rational choice neoinstitutional expectations. 
It will therefore be more interesting to track down the legal 
areas that are at stake for the cases in the dataset, as these 
are linked directly with the member states’ interests.  
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Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.999*** 
(14.80) 
 
 
        
Annulment 
Measure 
(Appeal) 
-1.162 
(-1.02) 
-1.247* 
(-1.71) 
        
Annulment 
Measure 
-0.794 -0.776         
(Decision) 
 
Annulment 
Measure 
(Directive) 
Annulment 
Measure 
(Regulation) 
Overall R-
squared 
Number of 
observations 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.379 
(-0.30) 
 
-1.427 
(-1.26) 
 
0.2951 
 
944 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.414 
(-0.48) 
 
-1.441* 
(-1.95) 
 
0.0111 
 
977 
        
 
Legal Area  
 
It is interesting to distinguish between cases in terms of the 
area that the annulment actions concern. Agriculture and 
competition account for more than half of the cases 
(57.88%). The European Steal and Coal Community 
(14.75%) and the External Relations and Commercial Policy 
(10.58%) represent the other two legal areas that trigger the 
majority of applications for annulments. All other areas of 
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community legislation were at stake in just some 16.79% of 
the cases.  
 
The following table reveals that the judges are unlikely to 
distinguish between most of the different legal areas. This 
is true for all of the above mentioned areas but External 
Relations and Commercial Policy. This area is more 
sensitive for member states compared to the rest and one 
would expect that all European legislation concerning the 
policies of external relations would be taken seriously 
enough by the member states not to allow for potential 
gaps or unclear and obscure legal norms that will not 
endure external revision. In any case it is evident that 
applications in the External Relations area are much less 
likely to bear success for the applicants. The External 
Relations are an extremely sensitive area for the member 
states and this negative correlation is totally in line with the 
rational choice neoinstitutional expectations. The judges are 
expected to act much more carefully when they have a case 
concerning the legal areas which fall within the realms of 
hardcore member state interests.  
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Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 2.034*** 
(15.02) 
 
 
        
Legal Area 
(Agriculture) 
0.104 
(0.43) 
-0.155 
(-0.72) 
        
Legal Area -0.077 -0.132         
(Competition) 
 
Legal Area 
(ECSC) 
 
Legal Area 
(External  
Relations and 
Commercial 
Policy) 
 
Overall R-
squared 
Number of 
observations 
(-0.31) 
 
-0.131 
(-0.43) 
 
-0.738** 
(-2.05) 
 
 
 
0.2934 
944 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.331 
(-1.32) 
 
-0.303 
(-1.01) 
 
 
 
0.0014 
977 
        
 
Procedural Stage: 
Number of judges  
 
Another interesting logistic regression is the one in which 
we have the variation of the Court’s decision controlled for 
the number of judges in each of the dataset cases. Once a 
newly initiated case application is registered, the President 
of the Court decides on the composition of the judges that 
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will sit, deliberate and prepare the ruling. It is a common 
practice to have cases of minor potential significance heard 
by a small chamber (3 to 5 judges) in the Court. Whereas 
those cases that concern more sensitive applications are 
usually held in front of more of the judges and often even 
in full chamber.   
 
The regression table shows that there is a very strong and 
positive correlation between the number of judges in the 
cases and their decision in favor of the application. This is 
of course self-evident if member states are in general more 
successful than non-member states in cases of annulment 
actions. As cases of member states are by default listened to 
in larger chambers of judges this correlation is not really 
surprising. What is interesting however is the fact that, 
once we add the Advocate General opinion as another 
independent variable in the regression, the statistically 
significant effect of the number of judges disappears. This 
is an illustration of the fact that in cases for which the 
President of the Court has decided that a higher number of 
judges will be necessary, the judges are less likely to 
deviate from the opinion of the Advocate General which is 
already anyway correlated positively with a decision in 
favor of the applicant.  
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Therefore it will be interesting to see whether this pattern is 
applied within the group of cases in which we have only 
member states as applicants. The regression here is quite 
different as I have the number of judges as the dependent 
variable and the variables ‘state’ and ‘big state' (1 if the 
applicant is France, Germany or the United Kingdom and 0 
otherwise) as independent ones. Interestingly enough the 
cases in which the applicant is a big state are heard by 
chambers comprised of a higher number of judges. The 
statistical significance at the 1% level of confidence is an 
indicator that this relationship is not accidental.  
 
In brief the presidents of the Court of Justice have most 
probably discriminated between bigger and smaller 
member state applicants. One can hardly find an 
explanation for this different from the rational choice 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.799*** 
(14.48) 
 
 
        
Number of 
Judges 
 
0.034 
(1.03) 
0.079*** 
(3.18) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3172 0.0086         
Number of 
observations 
943 976         
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neoinstitutional belief that the Court of Justice should be 
reacting rationally and strategically in situations that 
involve sensitive matters of national interests that may 
potentially trigger a conflict and threaten the institution's 
preferences and agenda. In the analysis of the various legal 
areas and contested measures of legislation one cannot find 
substantial differences when the different member states 
are compared. Therefore the sensitivity of the applications 
is indeed likely to originate from the political power of the 
member state that brought them. At the same time the 
judges can hardly stay indifferent to a situation in which 
they recognize that whenever a bigger state files an 
application they are convened in larger chambers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Number of 
judges 
 
 
 
  
State 1.057*** 
(5.76) 
 
 
        
Big State 
 
 
 
1.616*** 
(4.93) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.0343 0.0656         
Number of 
observations 
982 393         
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Advocate General seniority  
 
Another interesting aspect of extra legal factors that may 
potentially influence the decision making is the seniority of 
the main officials that act as agenda setters for the whole 
process before the very judgment is issued. These are the 
Advocate General and the Judge Rapporteur. The opinion 
of the Advocate General is by far the best predictor of the 
final ruling and it is worth considering the number of 
months in office that the respective Advocate General has 
spent at the moment he announced his opinion. It is a 
logical expectation to have the senior Advocate Generals 
feeling more comfortable in their decisions to the rather 
sensitive cases in comparison to the initial months of their 
mandates.   
 
At the same time, one might also assume that in the longer 
run seniority might display the potentially more 
conservative or more liberal stand that the Advocate 
General could have in his ideological approach to the 
national versus communitarian law conflict. If this is the 
case we are likely to witness statistically significant 
correlation between seniority and our dummy dependent 
variable of having a judgment in favor of the applicants 
that are trying to make a certain piece of EU legislation 
void. The regression however does not provide support for 
such an argument as there is no statistical significantly 
correlation based on the dataset between the seniority of 
the Advocate Generals and the dependent variable. 
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Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.807*** 
(14.65) 
 
 
        
Advocate 
General 
Seniority 
 
-0.024 
(-1.16) 
-0.027 
(-1.64) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3176 0.0024         
Number of 
observations 
944 947         
 
Judge Rapporteur seniority  
 
As already mentioned, it makes sense to apply an identical 
logic to the Judge Rapporteurs as well. The judge who has 
been given the task to act in the case as a Rapporteur has 
the substantial power to prepare the first draft of the ruling. 
The judges are initially to deliberate and discuss on this 
very draft and it is therefore a very responsible task. 
Collegiality, which the literature on extra-legal factors of 
judicial decision making recognizes as a potentially 
important variable, would make it less likely to have the 
judges ignore the stand of their colleague – especially if he 
has been in office long enough to have deserved generally 
agreed authority and respect. 
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The quantitative analysis however provides no arguments 
to strengthen the expectation that the Judge Rapporteurs in 
the Court of Justice of the European Union are likely to take 
extra-legal factors into account to the extent to which the 
ultimate wording of the judgments is a function of their 
draft. If rational choice institutionalists were to expect some 
correlation here it would be logical to have the Rapporteurs 
exploiting (or maybe even abusing) their senior position 
within the institution. This does not seem to be happening 
in practice though. 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.809*** 
(14.66) 
 
 
        
Judge 
Rapporteur 
Seniority 
 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.51) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3165 0.0002         
Number of 
observations 
944 947         
 
The following is an interesting observation regarding the 
weighted difference in the Advocate General’s seniority 
and that of the Judge Rapporteur for each particular case. 
The names of both officials are determined in advance so 
the Advocate General is aware of which judge is going to 
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be the Rapporteur for the case at stake. In the second 
regression, in which the seniority of the Advocate General 
is tested for correlation against the positivity of his opinion 
for the annulment action application, there is no 
statistically significant correlation. On the other hand, once 
we take the difference in the duration of the period in office 
for both officials, it seems that Advocate Generals are more 
likely to prepare opinions against the application when 
they are more senior than their Rapporteur counterparts. 
The statistical significance in this observation is not so 
strongly expressed but it is an interesting illustration of a 
potential situation in which an Advocate General decides 
to take over most of the responsibility for an eventual 
decision against the application for having a Rapporteur 
that was appointed in the Court relatively recently.  
Dependent 
variable: 
Opinion in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 I II 
 
  
Months AG 
more senior 
than Judge 
Rapporteur 
 
Advocate 
General 
Seniority 
 
-0.021* 
(-1.70) 
 
 
 
 
-0.019 
(-1.14) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.0024 0.0011         
Number of 
observations 
947 947         
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Judge Rapporteur nationality –  
 
What is much more interesting in terms of correlation 
between the Rapporteurs and the final judgments is their 
nationality. In the end, the cases of annulment actions have 
been deliberately chosen as most adequate for the purposes 
of our analysis exactly because they present the clearest 
form of contradiction between national and communitarian 
interests and legislation. As it has already been mentioned 
in Chapter I the national governments appoint the judges 
and Advocate Generals of their own choice. If they are to 
find these ‚representatives‛ accountable for their 
performance it can be done efficiently only through the 
opinions of the Advocate Generals and the decisions in 
which the respective judge is known to have acted as the 
Rapporteur.  
 
The results presented in the following table show positive 
and statistically significant correlations between the 
nationality of Belgian, German, French, British, Greek, Irish 
and Luxembourgish and the decision in favor of the 
applicant in the cases in which they had to judge.  The 
significance in this correlation however disappears when 
we add the opinion of the Advocate General as an 
additional variable in the regression. It is only the Greek 
nationality that remains significantly correlated and the 
Advocate General has been Greek in only 24 of all cases so 
nationality of the Rapporteurs does not seem to influence 
judicial decision making in the Court of Justice. 
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Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 2.027*** 
(14.91) 
         
B 
 
0.935 
(1.32) 
1.009* 
(1.87) 
        
D 0.851 1.082**         
 
DK 
 
E 
 
F 
 
GB 
 
GR 
 
I 
 
IRL 
 
L 
 
NEW 
 
NL 
 
P 
 
S 
 
SF 
(1.19) 
0.520 
(0.67) 
-0.118 
(-0.11) 
0.908 
(1.21) 
0.818 
(1.07) 
1.551** 
(2.04) 
-0.094 
(-0.13) 
0.636 
(0.89) 
1.065 
(1.47) 
-0.088 
(-0.09) 
0.596 
(0.84) 
0.621 
(0.82) 
0.889 
(1.12) 
-0.293 
(2.01) 
0.789 
(1.32) 
0.921 
(1.41) 
1.428*** 
(2.61) 
1.276** 
(2.26) 
1.646*** 
(2.68) 
0.333 
(0.60) 
0.994* 
(1.76) 
1.294** 
(2.39) 
-0.468 
(-0.60) 
0.827 
(1.51) 
0.619 
(1.03) 
0.195 
(0.29) 
0.619 
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Overall R-
squared 
Number of 
observations 
 
(-0.29) 
 
0.3042 
 
944 
(0.90) 
 
0.0238 
 
977 
 
Advocate General nationality –  
 
The nationality of Advocate Generals is another factor that 
the dataset enables to be tested for correlation with the 
opinions that they provide. The logic here is identical in 
terms of the assumptions of rational choice neoinstitutional 
theory. Namely, if national governments are acting 
strategically as rational actors then member states should 
be expected to appoint such Advocate Generals that are 
prone to decide in favor of national interests rather than 
communitarian ones. Of course this can be true only for the 
complicated cases that allow for alternative and 
controversial interpretations as in the end Advocate 
Generals have the very responsible task to consider the law. 
But one of the main assumptions in this paper is that at 
least some of the cases that member states bring before the 
Court of Justice are anyway such that allow for adversative 
ultimate judgments and these are exactly the cases in which 
a biased Advocate General might cease the opportunity to 
make the difference. And even if these occasions are not 
that often they will be captured by the statistical analysis.  
Performing a complete regression analysis in this occasion 
is a bit more complicated as usually the Advocate Generals 
have the nationality of the bigger member states. So I have 
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decided to create a separate group of Advocate Generals 
which are not nationals of one of the 4 big member states 
(Germany, France, Italy or the UK) as otherwise the 
nationals of states like Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg or 
Portugal have provided opinions of a small number of 
cases which might potentially alter the results significantly.  
 
The analysis implies that nationality of the Advocate 
General impacts his opinion only in the cases when he is 
French (against the annulment action application) or British 
(in favor of the applicant). This effect might not be based on 
a very strong statistical significance but can still be a subject 
of interesting further research as the member states of 
France and the United Kingdom are known to fit well into 
the roles that these results hint when national versus 
supranational interests are involved. 
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Dependent 
variable: 
Opinion in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Germany 0.000 
(0.00) 
         
France 
 
-0.374* 
(-1.70) 
         
Italy 0.344          
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
Overall R-
squared 
Number of 
observations 
 
(1.52) 
0.462** 
(2.08) 
 
0.0119 
 
947 
         
 
 
Post procedural variables: 
 
Duration  
 
The duration of the period between each case was 
registered and its judgment was provided is another 
variable that I managed to gather information for and it is 
interesting to see whether the Court has been recorded to 
take longer to reach a decision against the applicants. A 
rational choice neoinstitutionalist might argue that the 
Court should be interested in and therefore wait for 
member state reactions before it publishes its ruling.  
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The statistical analysis does not seem to provide any 
evidence supporting such expectations as the duration of a 
case is not correlated with the final decision no matter 
whether we control for the opinion of the Advocate 
General or not. 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.810*** 
(14.66) 
 
 
        
Duration 
 
0.005 
(0.83) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3169 0.0003         
Number of 
observations 
944 977         
 
Referrals in EU documents  
 
The following two regressions might not match the profile 
of factors that matter in the national/supranational axis of 
debates. They do not even seem to fit the rational choice 
neoinstitutional theoretical background. However, for 
matters of completeness, I believe these variables should be 
included in this dissertation's analysis. As they are a very 
interesting indicator for the significance of each particular 
case other scholars could use them to extract landmark 
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cases out of the whole pool of annulment actions in the 
period of 1954-2005. 
 
What is even more surprising is the fact that one of the 
variables - the one regarding the number of times a case 
was referred to in all various EU documents – happens to 
be correlated positively and significantly with my 
dependent variable. The effect of the year in which the case 
took place has to be isolated as obviously older cases could 
have been cited in the Community documents or the 
Court’s case-law referrals for a longer period of time and 
that is why I have the ‘case_year’ variable present in the 
analysis as well. It is for the goals of some other research 
fields to explain why the successful annulment action 
applications were more often referred to in the consequent 
EU documents. The answer here is most certainly in the 
institutions that prepared these documents and this has not 
been the Court. On the other hand, the number of cases in 
which the Court itself referred to a case from the archive of 
its case-law does not seem to be correlated with the 
decision's dimension of having a successful annulment 
application or not. 
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Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.803*** 
(14.62) 
 
 
        
Referrals in 
EU 
documents 
 
Case Year 
 
0.004* 
(1.81) 
 
0.003 
(0.44) 
0.005*** 
(2.64) 
 
0.001 
(0.18) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3192 0.0063         
Number of 
observations 
943 961         
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in 
favor of 
applicant 
 
 
 
  
Opinion 1.813*** 
(14.68) 
         
Referrals in 
Court of 
Justice case-
law 
 
Case Year 
0.016 
(1.60) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.010 
(1.11) 
0.000 
(-0.07) 
        
Overall R-
squared 
0.3183 0.0011         
Number of 
observations 
943 961         
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I am using several multivariate ordered logistic regression 
analysis tests in order to control for the combined effect of 
the abovementioned three groups (pre-procedural, 
procedural and post-procedural) of variables. These 
variables represent all publicly available legal and extra-
legal factors that have been coded in the dataset and are 
theoretically expected to potentially influence the court’s 
decision-making. The dependent variable again is the 
decision of the Court which is accompanied by a dummy 
for the Advocate General opinion as an independent 
variable in all of the tests. The ‘opinion’ variable is the best 
predictor for the Court of Justice decision as in more than 
80% of the cases the judges followed the opinion of the 
Advocate Generals which is thus also an appropriate proxy 
in which most of the purely legal considerations of each 
particular case should be embodied. The second 
independent variable that is present in each of the 
regressions is either a dummy (‘state’) which determines 
whether the applicant is a state or an individual; or another 
dummy (‘big state’) to distinguish between the three most 
powerful states and biggest net contributors in the EU 
budget – Germany, France and UK – when only the cases in 
which the applicant is a member state are left in the dataset. 
 
Pre-procedural stage 
 
The first four tests involve those variables that concern 
mostly the preliminary legal aspects of the cases which 
should serve to check the theoretical expectations of having 
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the case complexity, the legal area or the legal measure that 
is contested as factors influencing decision making process. 
All major groups of legal areas and measures are turned 
into separate dummy variables to check for the potential 
effect of each of them. The impact of legal measures in the 
second test is limited only to the categories of decisions and 
regulations as there are almost no observations involving 
actions for the annulment of a directive or appeals that 
were brought in front of the Court of Justice by a member 
state. Regulations are found to be much harder to annul, 
while the rest of the variables are of a rather insignificant 
effect.  
 
Procedural stage 
 
Another four regressions were run in order to account for 
the potential impact of member state driven appointments 
of Advocate Generals and Judge Rapporteurs. The 
functions of the Judge Rapporteur are of such a special 
interest as they are assigned by the President of the Court 
in order to monitor the progress of the respective case. 
Eventually all judges would deliberate on the basis of a 
draft judgment prepared by the Judge Rapporteur himself. 
Moreover, the Rapporteur is responsible for an assessment 
of the complexity and the significance of the case and 
proposes the chamber or the number of judges that should 
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deal with the case in his opinion98. Even though the 
procedure offers so wide-ranging agenda setting functions 
to the Rapporteurs the nationality of these judges proves to 
be of little significance. In fact the Greek was the only 
nationality to have a statistically significant impact on the 
decision but at the same time Greeks had the least number 
of cases assigned to them. However, there is a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between the French 
Rapporteurs and the dependent variable when the test is 
limited only to those cases where the applicant is a EU 
member state. On the other hand the nationality of the 
Advocate General has no significant effect on the Court’s 
judgments. Thus, it can be argued that Kenney’s findings 
that governments generally do not exert political influence 
through the members of the Court assigned by them are 
confirmed.  
 
Post procedural variables 
 
On average an annulment action case is cited in more than 
26 community documents out of which almost 6 are later 
judgments99 of the Court itself. Nevertheless, the notion of 
legal significance or precedent is not correlated with the 
rulings, as the number of later citations of each respective 
case in the consecutive case-law of the Court of Justice as 
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well as in all European documents are of no statistical 
importance. The same result is true for the case duration.  
 
In brief, the results of the three types of variables grouped 
together – to test for their combined effect in each of the 
case development phases – did not change much compared 
to their impact when regressed against the Court's decision 
separately. Interestingly, the dummies for a member state 
and a ‘big state’ applicant keep their positive statistical 
significance levels in 9 out of the 10 tests. To put it simply 
the judges of the Court of Justice seem to discriminate 
between states and non-governmental applicants. What is 
even more the three biggest and most powerful EU 
members enjoy a preferential attitude as these are more 
likely to initiate a successful annulment action.  
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Decision in favor 
of applicant 
 
Pre-Procedural Stage 
 
 
Procedural Stage 
Post-Procedural 
variables 
Opinion of 
Advocate 
General 
2.004*** 
(14.74) 
2.186*** 
(9.11) 
2.028*** 
(14.96) 
2.125*** 
(9.57) 
2.02*** 
(14.88) 
2.128*** 
(9.26) 
1.989*** 
(14.54) 
2.059*** 
(9.02) 
1.997*** 
(14.71) 
2.096*** 
(9.42) 
State 0.459** 
(2.02) 
 0.380* 
(1.83) 
 0.375** 
(2.06) 
 0.335* 
(1.87) 
 0.466*** 
(2.71) 
 
Big State 
 
 0.529* 
(1.80) 
 0.544** 
(1.99) 
 0.440 
(1.44) 
 0.651** 
(2.06) 
 0.539* 
(1.94) 
Legal Matters -0.055 
(-0.78) 
0.038 
(0.35) 
-0.041 
(-0.54) 
-0.017 
(-0.16) 
      
Case Year -0.004 
(-0.47) 
-0.021 
(-1.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.70) 
-0.015 
(-0.99) 
      
Annulment 
Measure 
(Appeal) 
-1.071 
(-1.02) 
         
 
Annulment 
Measure 
(Decision) 
 
-0.944 
(-0.90) 
 
-0.508 
(-0.73) 
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Annulment 
Measure 
(Directive) 
 
-0.712 
(-0.58) 
         
Annulment 
Measure 
(Regulation) 
-1.572 
(-1.48) 
-1.319* 
(-1.70) 
        
Legal Area 
(Agriculture) 
  0.033 
(0.12) 
0.372 
(0.90) 
      
Legal Area 
(Competition) 
  -0.023 
(-0.09) 
0.303 
(0.69) 
      
Legal Area 
(ECSC) 
  -0.064 
(-0.19) 
0.885 
(0.76) 
      
Legal Area 
(External 
Relations and 
Commercial 
Policy) 
  -0.599 
(-1.61) 
-0.608 
(-0.56) 
      
Number of 
Judges 
    0.047 
(1.46) 
0.038 
(0.65) 
0.042 
(1.31) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
  
Advocate 
General 
Seniority 
    -0.016 
(-0.80) 
-0.038 
(-1.23) 
-0.026 
(-1.20) 
-0.039 
(-0.92) 
  
Judge 
Rapporteur 
Seniority 
    -0.005 
(-0.21) 
-0.028 
(-0.62) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
  
Advocate 
General 
Nationality 
      None None   
Judge 
Rapporteur 
Nationality 
    1.517* 
(1.85) - 
GR 
1.835* 
(1.84) – 
FRA 
    
Referrals in EU 
documents 
        0.002 
(0.47) 
-0.003 
(-0.36) 
Referrals in ECJ 
case-law 
        0.000 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.16) 
Case Duration 
 
        -0.006 
(-0.98) 
-0.006 
(-0.55) 
Overall R-
squared 
0.2985 0.3411 0.2959 0.3189 0.3097 0.3408 0.3045 0.3384 0.2935 0.3120 
Number of 
observations 
944 348 944 366 943 366 943 366 943 365 
Note: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses (*Statistically significant at p<.1; ** 
Statistically significant at p<.05; *** Statistically significant at p<.01) 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
The Critical Junctures in 
the Court’s Path 
Dependency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
The New Legal Order in the European Community: The 
Court of Justice and Historical Institutionalism 
 
The European legal system that was originally envisaged in 
the 1950s was rather weak and the way in which it was 
designed left little powers to the Court of Justice to affect 
member state policies or to enforce governments 
compliance. Today this initial legal system is significantly 
transformed and it was mostly the Court of Justice that 
made this transformation happen. The major instrument 
that CJEU used to generate this metamorphosis is 
undoubtedly the reference for a preliminary ruling. This 
procedure enabled national courts to ask the CJEU for its 
interpretation of a certain piece of legislation. In the 1960s 
the Court of Justice did not miss the opportunity to allow 
individuals to bring in their national courts issues of 
conflict between EU and national law that affected them. 
Within a year the Court also widened its institutional 
powers by adopting the principle of supremacy of 
European to national law. The Court of Justice based these 
rulings on its contentious arguments that the Treaty of 
Rome created a ‚new legal order of international law‛ and 
that its spirit determined the irreversible transfer of 
national sovereignty to a supranational European level. 
 
Of course these innovations had to go through the approval 
of the member states as well as their national judiciaries. 
The national courts had good reasons to object as the new 
order implied that within this EU legal system they would 
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suddenly become a subordinate agent of the Court of 
Justice. Transferring these competences to the CJEU meant 
that the highest national courts would lose their monopoly 
even over the interpretation of certain constitutional 
provisions. Moreover, the national courts would thus 
eventually channel decisions that will potentially import a 
conflict between EU and national law at the dislike of their 
governments. At the same time the governments could 
present even more sound arguments against this new legal 
order.  
 
There is absolutely no doubt that the Court went well 
beyond what the member states believed they agreed to 
when signing the treaties. The Court of Justice based its 
rulings on the ‚special and original nature‛ of the Treaty of 
Rome but nevertheless one can hardly find a politician or a 
scholar in the 1960s who can be cited for perceiving the 
Treaty of Rome really as one of an extraordinary character. 
In any case the Court has used the opportunities presented 
by national court’s referrals to make a plenty of significant 
legal expansions of the EU authority. As some even say it 
changed the Treaty of Rome in order to build a common 
market and make European law more enforceable100. And, 
thus, the governments needed to have a very good reason 
in order to delegate their national sovereignty to an 
institution that would interpret actively the EU legislation. 
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Even though high courts, as courts of last instance, must 
refer question of EU law to the CJEU, the constitutional 
courts in Italy, Belgium, Germany and France have never 
made a referral101. On the other hand lower courts, which 
were used to having a court hierarchically above them that 
could overrule their decisions, grabbed the chance to 
reopen legal debates that seemed to have already been 
settled. Having the Court’s ruling and interpretation 
behind the decision of a lower court judges would amplify 
the effect of the latter and make it harder to reverse by their 
upper counterparts. Of course, just as higher courts would 
restrain from making a referral that would allow a broader 
and more importantly expansionist interpretation of the EU 
law, the lower courts would also avoid asking the Court of 
Justice such questions that could undermine their authority 
and competences.  
 
In their actions the politicians follow a more pragmatic 
approach and are driven mostly by results in terms of their 
policy agenda. Thus, it is not surprising at all that the CJEU 
established the legal principles it needed with an extreme 
caution. In fact usually when the Court introduced a new 
principle it did not apply it to the case at stake. However, it 
is still worth to point out the evident argument that 
politicians would prefer to avoid public confrontations 
with their national courts officials concerning the 
separation of powers or the constitutionality of a certain 
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bill. Thus, politicians often found different ways to 
circumvent compliance as it was easier to tackle the 
unwanted consequences of the Court’ rulings than to enter 
an open debate on the essence of a given legal principle. In 
the end it is a must to take into consideration that, even 
though being the ‚masters of the Treaty‛, the politicians 
had just one option of sanctioning judicial activism and it 
was amending the Treaty in its parts that they found the 
CJEU interpreted inadequately. And changing the Treaty is 
not an easy task to do as it requires unanimity and involves 
a great loads of institutional reforms. The institutional 
conflict between the principal and the agent is therefore a 
contest determined by bounded rationality, as governments 
that are willing to prevent the unwanted activism of the 
judges in Luxembourg can not make a sure bet on having 
all EU members supporting their stand or a Treaty 
amendment.  
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union generally has 
jurisdiction for three forms of proceedings. These are direct 
actions, references for preliminary rulings, and appeals. 
Direct actions arise most often in cases where the European 
Commission initiates an infringement procedure in 
accordance to Article 226 EC against a member state which 
the Commission believes failed to fulfill its obligations. 
Another essential part of the direct action cases are the 
annulment actions in which a member state, community 
institution or, under certain circumstances, even an 
individual can challenge the validity of a legislative 
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measure that was adopted at the European level. Appeals 
are always brought as cases against a ruling of the Court of 
First Instance which was created in the last decade to 
reduce the workload of the judges in the main court in 
Luxembourg. Almost all of these cases are rather technical, 
the Court of Justice practically has little room of maneuver 
but to follow the letter of the law and it is unlikely that the 
Court can act creatively in its judgment to form some kind 
of a legal principle that would emerge out of them. In these 
instances the Court of Justice acts as a traditional national 
court. On the contrary, in the preliminary ruling cases the 
CJEU is enabled and actually referred to by the national 
courts to provide its interpretation of the law. In this 
procedure the Court of Justice in its actions resembles 
rather a constitutional court. That is why the famous 
principles that the judges in Luxembourg managed to 
establish and develop were introduced in their preliminary 
rulings. Any book of European law posing the argument 
that the Court has allegedly constitutionalized the 
European legal system would be based on extensive 
analysis of the path that the CJEU has set by its most 
famous legal doctrines such as the supremacy of European 
law or the principle of direct effect.  
 
Typically half of the cases that are brought in front of the 
Court, at least in the more recent years, are references for 
preliminary rulings. There are also the cases in which the 
relationship between European and national law, 
respectively the institutional linkage of the CJEU vis-à-vis 
128 
 
national courts, is really at stake. Under the procedure of 
references for preliminary rulings national courts may, and 
sometimes actually must, refer a question to the Court of 
Justice to ask for the Court’s clarification of given points of 
EU law. The Court of Justice is most often asked to verify 
whether there is a conflict between national and European 
law or if the latter complies with the community 
legislation. As it is the preliminary rulings where scholars 
found the Court of Justice to act as a performer of 
expansive judicial activism in the most palpable manner, it 
is inevitable that I try to take a deeper insight in the most 
famous cases. My main argument is that it has been exactly 
these cases that predetermined further decision-making 
and this observation fits perfectly the concept of path 
dependency that is the main instrument of analysis from a 
historical institutionalist point of view. 
 
A common belief is that the CJEU is most active in its 
interpretations when the process of political integration is 
slowed down. Effective international courts are able to 
convince domestic political institutions to comply, either 
through direct persuasion or via pressure from supra and 
sub-state actors102. However, one should also consider the 
linkage in the opposite direction. As Karen Alter puts it 
today there is no doubt ‘that Euro-law associations made 
possible the Court of Justice’s constitutionalizing doctrines 
by creating test cases, by acting as the ECJ’s and 
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Commission’s kitchen cabinet, by spurring individuals to 
bold action, and by creating an impression of a momentum 
favoring the Court’s doctrinal creations’103. Indeed the 
neofunctionalists’ theory provided for the influence of 
different ‘nationally constituted groups with specific 
interests and aims’ that they found to be driving the 
process of integration104. These groups would embody the 
interests of the business, politics or science105 or can in 
general comprise of any self-interested actors who could 
potentially exploit the opportunities that litigation in 
international courts offer106. Even though legal integration 
as a consequence of the CJEU’s judicial activism was clearly 
a function of the essential efforts of such interest groups 
one should not attribute the constitutionalization of Europe 
solely to the actions of these agents. If it was the case, as 
Alter argues, we could not explain the failure of the ECSC 
to construct a strong framework for a liberated coal and 
steel community, as well as the lack of activism that Court 
of Justice featured in the first decade of its existence. 
Neither can one clarify why judicial institutions in other 
projects of regional integration similar to the CJEU (for 
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example the Andean Tribunal of Justice) did not manage to 
replicate its success albeit the presence of identical 
circumstances for these self-interested actors to emerge. 
Therefore there is no automaticity in the international legal 
process, but it is a range of additional conditions that 
should be present for having these interested groups 
agendas accomplished. 
 
Integrating the Court of Justice Doctrine in the Member 
States 
 
The impact of Euro-law advocacy movements as Alter calls 
them has been significant since the very first two key 
rulings that initiated the process of European legal 
integration. It is not surprising at all that the 15 of the first 
18 preliminary references came from Dutch Courts as the 
1953 Dutch constitution allowed for the supremacy of 
international law107. The famous Van Gend en Loos cases 
was brought in front of the Court of Justice by a young 
Ducth lawyer who was a member of the Ducth euro-law 
association. It is known that two years earlier this 
association generated a task force to determine which are 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome that can be seen as 
directly applicable under Dutch law as national authorities 
should find them supreme to the incompatible Dutch 
legislation. 
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The Van Gend en Loos case meant that European law is 
practically supreme to the national one in the Netherlands 
as for the Dutch legal system direct effect stemming from 
European legislation was just identical to EU law 
supremacy. Thus, the contribution of the Dutch legal order 
to the emergence of the CJEU’s doctrinal principles was 
important and, compared to the other EU members at the 
time, the Netherlands indeed featured the optimal 
constitutional setting in this context108. In most of the other 
countries, however, the legal systems prescribed that 
primacy had to go to the last adopted law. In short, this 
meant that national legislators could simply overrule the 
direct effect that the Van Gend en Loos case established by 
passing a law against it.   
The Costa vs. Enel decision followed quickly to establish 
the supremacy of European law. Legal activism played its 
role quite extensively as well. The 62-year-old lawyer 
Flaminio Costa and his colleague compatriot Giangaleazzo 
Stendardi contested a negligible electricity bill to put 
forward a test-case against the Italian nationalization law. 
As Vauchez puts it, ‘test-case was a familiar strategy to 
Stendardi’ who can be cited for writing in 1958 that ‘it will 
be necessary to plead judicially such an issue, in order to 
provoke a decision for example of the European Court of 
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Justice’109 in order to compensate for the lack of clarification 
in the treaties about the EU law supremacy. 
 
Even though the Court of Justice announced its doctrine 
with the Van Gend en Loos and Costa cases the principles 
of direct effect and Community law supremacy in order to 
get really established these had to pass the final test of 
approval by the member states national judicial authorities. 
It is interesting to observe this process for each of the EC 
members in the 1960s as well as for the United Kingdom 
which had its stance even though it joined the EU a decade 
later.  
 
Belgium and the Netherlands 
 
 The Belgian constitution in the 1960s provided for no effect 
of the treaties as long as they have not obtained 
parliamentary approval. Nevertheless the Belgian courts 
never contested the CJEU and the direct effect principle for 
instant applicability of secondary EC legislation. This 
tendency of Belgian judges probably originates in their 
traditional international outlook110. The question with 
European law supremacy to conflicting national rules 
however took quite some time to penetrate the Belgian 
legal order. Belgium is one of the states that had the lex 
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posterior derogat legi priori principle, according to which in 
case of a conflict between international treaties and 
subsequently adopted laws the latter should prevail. Still 
treaties have always been the source of Belgian 
administrative law, so such cases were rare in Belgium111. It 
was the notorious 1971 Le Ski decision that made it all 
official. In fact the Belgian Cour de cassation reasoned its 
ruling with the argument ‘that the treaties which have 
created Community law have instituted a new legal system 
in whose favor the member states have restricted the 
exercise of their sovereign powers in the areas determined 
by those treaties’. In other words the national court used 
the exact language of the Court of Justice in its Costa vs. 
ENEL judgment. This decision was met with expected 
approval but there is an up-to-date debate on whether the 
source from which the supremacy derives is the Belgian 
constitution or the supranational EC legal order and the 
international treaties.  
 
The Netherlands is probably the member state in which the 
doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European Union was 
met with the least resistance if any. The Dutch legal 
tradition is characterized by its monist perceptions on the 
relationship between national and international law. Since 
1953, when the constitution of the Netherlands entered into 
force the supremacy of European law, as per se 
international law, has practically almost never been 
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contested. It can even be argued that it was the Dutch legal 
system that influenced the European one. The Netherlands 
brought the very first reference for a preliminary ruling 
before the CJEU in 1961 and since then has kept being 
among the most active member states to have their courts 
asking for the interpretation of the Court of Justice.112  This 
can of course be explained by the lack of a Constitutional 
Court in the Netherlands. The early activism of the Dutch 
judicial authorities113 led to their reference for the famous 
Van Gend en Loos case in which the CJEU established its 
direct effect principle. The president of the Court of Justice 
of the European at that time was another Dutch, Judge 
Donner, who was known for sharing the traditional monist 
beliefs of legal thought in the Netherlands concerning the 
relationship between national and international law. In fact 
the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz was never the subject 
of ongoing legal debates in the country and this can be 
attributed to the absence of any provisions in the 
Constitution that somehow define the notion of sovereignty 
loss or the relevant limits in this context.114   
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France 
 
The French legal system is peculiar for the existence of 
three supreme courts. Even though these three institutions 
act with practically no interaction between them they have 
all adopted both the ‚direct effect‛ and the ‚supremacy‛ 
doctrine. In contrast to some other member states France 
featured a monist view on the relation between 
international and national law and as the constitution of the 
Fifth French republic says ‘treaties possess a superior 
authority’. Probably the final step of compliance with the 
EU supremacy principle was the Jacques Vibre case that the 
Cour de Cassation ruled on in 1975115. In short the object of 
this case was a fiscal law that contradicted the treaty. The 
lower French Courts in fact acted in accordance with the 
treaty and ruled against the fiscal law. However, they 
based their judgment on the French constitution and not on 
the logic that the Court of Justice used in its Costa vs. ENEL 
decision. This was not enough for the camp of the pro-
European legal circles and the Cour de Cassation decided 
to base its ruling on both, the Constitution and the treaty. 
Basically that is the modus operandi that this French Court 
kept using up to date116. The role of Adolph Touffait has to 
be emphasized as he was the public prosecutor at the time 
when the Jacques Vibre decision was taken and he was also 
known to be a enthusiastic supporter of European legal 
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integration in France. In fact Touffait conclusions on the 
case recommended that the Court should base its ruling 
entirely on the ‘specific nature’ of the Community treaties. 
As a matter of fact Touffait was appointed as a judge in the 
Court of Justice just one year after the Jacques Vibre ruling. 
 
The Conseil d’Etat, one of the three highest French courts, 
waited until 1990 to engage with the supremacy doctrine. 
Even though based entirely on the French constitution its 
Nicolo decision basically confirmed the primacy of 
community law over subsequent national statute 
legislation. One should also consider the fact that Yves 
Galmot, the French judge in the CJEU in the 1982-1988 
period, became a member of the Conseil d’Etat right after 
his mandate in Luxembourg has finished and the famous 
Nicolo decision followed just one year later117. 
 
Germany 
 
The Maastricht decision that the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany issued in 1993 involved the problems of 
sovereignty and Kompetenz-Kompetenz issues, as it 
examined and redefined the bounds to which German 
national powers can be transferred to the European 
supranational level. The Federal Constitutional Court is the 
highest court in Germany and therefore its decisions are the 
most relevant regarding any issues of European integration 
as all lower courts must observe them. In its Maastricht 
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decision the German court practically made a significant 
step back from its previous stand as the Court’s case-law 
beforehand envisaged that only the acts of German 
authorities can directly be a subject of constitutional 
complaints. After the famous Maastricht ruling the case is 
that acts that are considered to be beyond the limit of the 
European Community can also be challenged and reviewed 
by the Federal Constitutional Court.  
 
It has to be emphasized that the Constitutional Court of 
Germany expressed its protectionist position towards 
European law even earlier with the so-called ‚Solange‛ 
cases. In Solange the Court settled a principle according to 
which Community legislation is practically superior as long 
as it does not violate the basic rights that German citizens 
have under the German national law. As a matter of fact, 
however, the CJEU anyway could serve well enough to 
protect these basic rights as those are defined in the treaties 
as well. With the Maastricht ruling the Federal 
Constitutional Court simply abandoned the basic rights 
doctrine or rather extended it to assure that the general 
principle of democracy is sustained in regard to a transfer 
of national sovereignty. The right of direct elections for 
example guarantees the democratic legitimacy that the 
German Parliament holds concerning its influence over the 
development of European integration. In other words the 
Court decided that the control of member states is still 
preserved no matter that they ratified the Maastricht 
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Treaty, which was simply an act of transferring strictly 
limited powers to the Community level.(Kokott) 
 
The view of the Federal Constitutional Court towards the 
European law eroded from one of an autonomous legal 
order to an approach of dealing with it as a mere 
international law. Indeed, in its original ruling in Solange I 
in 1974 with which the Court decided that preliminary 
requests for norm control are admissible, ‚as long as 
Community law does not contain a valid and formulated 
catalogue of basic rights established by a parliament which 
is equivalent to the catalogue of basic rights of the 
(German) Basic Law‛. This judgment was also a subject of 
certain criticism which claimed that it implied having the 
German basic rights as a milestone standard for community 
rights. Thus five years later, probably as a reaction to this 
criticism, in 1979 the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled 
that ‚The Senate leaves open whether and possibly how far 
– may be in view of the political and legal developments in 
the European Area accomplished in the meantime – the 
principles of the decision of 29 May 1974 can be further 
upheld unrestricted‛ (Vielleicht-Beschuss).  
 
Finally, with its Solange II ruling, as the highest German 
court noted that the needed standard of basic rights 
protection is already guaranteed to match the requirements 
of the German Basic Law, the CJEU was found to be a 
lawful judge that all German citizens are entitled to by the 
German Constitution. According to the court this provision 
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can hold, ‚as long as the European Communities, in 
particular the Court of Justice, generally ensures an 
effective protection of the basic rights against Community 
acts, which basically corresponds to the protection of basic 
rights compelled by the Basic Law‛. (Solange II) 
 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is a term denoting the legal ability 
to determine someone’s competences. Thus, Kompetenz-
Kompetenz is widely relevant in international law. The 
classic paradigm is that international organization do not 
have Kompetenz-Kompetenz but it is rather states that do. 
In other words supranational organizations, similar to the 
European Community, are holders of only those 
competences that were delegated to them by the member 
states. Within the EU context the notion of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz implies the question of which are the 
competent judicial authorities to decide whether a certain 
Community decision is properly taken for being within the 
competences that the member states transferred to the 
supranational level. The Maastricht decision put into words 
the fact that the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
never considered the European Community as a 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz holder. Moreover it consists of 
thorough indications of potential review powers that the 
German highest court could exploit at its discretion if in the 
future some Kompetenz-Kompetenz is transferred to the 
supranational European level.  
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Even though the Federal Court explicitly mentions that in 
case European institutions develop the treaty of Maastricht 
beyond its framework all legal instruments that such an 
activity generates would not be binding within German 
territory, the highest German court still finds it appropriate 
to announce that it will exercise its authority ‚in a 
cooperative relationship with the CJEU‛.  In other words 
the Maastricht decision means that the German Court 
expects that the institutions of the Community must respect 
the constitutional specificities of each member state.  
 
Italy 
 
Considering the relationship between European and Italian 
law one has to take into account the fact that Italian judicial 
authorities have adopted an entirely dualist approach since 
the very signing of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, in Italy the 
realm of European law is simply viewed as one of 
international law – as a separate legal system which has no 
hierarchical features vis-à-vis the national one unless to the 
extent to which the Italian state has transferred certain 
competences and sovereignty by adopting the respective 
legal texts in the treaties. The principal actor in Italy in the 
context of conflict between European and national legal 
norms is the Constitutional Court. This Court has used the 
wording of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution as a legal 
basis to justify the limitation of sovereignty which in turn 
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predetermines the degree to which European law can be 
applicable on Italian territory.118  
 
Having in mind the dualist views of the Constitutional 
Court it was not surprising to find it standing against the 
principle of European law supremacy. In 1964 with its 
decision in the Costa vs. Enel case the Constitutional Court 
affirmed the lex posterior derogate priori principle according 
to which in the conflict of national and European law it is 
the last adopted legal norm that always prevails. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union could not allow such an 
approach as this would mean that the parliament of a 
member state can make pointless any legal act adopted at 
the Community level. As the case was sent for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice as well it 
exploited it to create its famous doctrine of supremacy.  
 
It took almost 10 years for the Constitutional Court to agree 
with the supremacy of European law principle. In its 
Frontini decision in the end of 1973 the Court confirmed 
that in a case of a contradiction between community and 
national ones the former prevail in case they are older than 
the latter. This reiteration of the lex posterior derogate priori 
principle was also extended by providing the possibility of 
judicial review over conflicting national legislation in the 
                                                 
118
 Article 11 of the Italian constitution says that „Italy agrees, on conditions of 
equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be 
necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy 
promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends‟. 
142 
 
alternative case.119 These cases, however, could be referred 
only to the Constitutional Court. After another 10 years, 
with its Granital ruling, the Constitutional Court finally 
approved the supremacy of European legal acts even 
though this concerned only the measures having direct 
effect. The Court also allowed judges of  lower-ranked 
courts to apply this principle instantly in their chambers. 
Moreover, somehow similar to the German experience, the 
Constitutional Court of Italy reserved for itself the 
monopoly of competences in cases that involve the 
fundamental rights and principles established by the Italian 
constitution.  
 
The Constitutional Court never really discredited or 
questioned the doctrine of direct effect and in some of its 
rulings in the 1980s120 has chosen to follow a very open 
approach that allowed for practically all types of European 
legislation to be directly applicable. The Italian highest 
court also did not address the issue of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz but its overall dualist stands and especially its 
conditional authorization of the supremacy principle are 
indicative enough to suggest that it would give the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz power to the state and not to the 
community.121 In any case it is worth mentioning that the 
                                                 
119
 When the more recently adopted piece of legislation is the national one. 
120
 Corte Costituzionale 1985, no. 232 and Corte Costituzionale 1989, no. 389.  
121
 Cartabia, Marta. The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship 
Between the Italian Legal System and the European Union. Edited by 
Slaughter, Anne-Marrie‟ Stone Sweet, Alec and Weiler, Joseph. Oxford, 1998 
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Constitutional Court of Italy files its first ever reference to 
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling only in 2008. 
 
Constitutionalizing the Treaty 
 
It has been shown how the principles of supremacy and 
direct effect led to a wave of reactions within the member 
states judicial systems. These two principles can be 
observed as a critical juncture that predetermined the 
overall consequent development of European law. Indeed 
none of the brave further CJEU rulings that changed the 
status quo within the Union in legal terms would be 
possible if it was not for the principle of EU law 
supremacy. Its introduction has started an irreversible flow 
of events that inevitably led to the deepening of integration 
in Europe. Thus, it is obvious that the whole course of legal 
integration in the EU can be understood as a spill over 
effect of the Courts’ doctrine.   
 
The concept of path dependency, as understood by the 
neoinstitutionlists, can be applied appropriately to the case 
law of judicial institutions especially when the notion of a 
precedent is involved. It is natural that when courts decide 
actual cases basing their judgments along previous rulings 
they seem performing an unbiased and in general less 
political function. Therefore precedents constitute a type of 
constraint that predetermines to a certain degree the 
arguments that different actors from both sides of the bar 
would hope to use with success. That is exactly why the 
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main legal doctrines that the Court established in the 1960s 
and their implementation within the legal systems of the 
union’s member states represents a course of events that 
happened to be particularly crucial for the whole process of 
legal integration in the EU, or what many scholars would 
rather address as the constitutionalizing of the treaty. 
 
The choices that the judges in Luxembourg made to 
introduce a given legal principle by creating a precedent 
can be observed as the so called ‘critical juncture’ moments 
in which an enduring impact is created. An impact that will 
predetermine the limits of freedom that further judges in 
the institution will enjoy when none of those who have set 
the precedent are still in office. 
 
It would be of course misleading to claim that CJEU case-
law can be explained by the historical institutionalist 
patterns of path dependency and critical junctures if it was 
only for the cases that established the supremacy of 
European law or the notion of direct effect. It can well be 
argued that these were simply practical issues that the 
court had to decide inevitably as the alternative would not 
allow any reasonable performance of the institution’s 
competences. Indeed the supremacy and the direct effect 
concepts, the latter considerably more than the former, had 
their political implications which went well beyond the 
expectations of the European governments. But one can 
hardly disagree that the alternative would simply 
undermine the overall purpose and value of all legislation 
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that is adopted at the supranational level. In a way this 
constitutionalization process was justified for the lack of 
other plausible options that would still enable the whole 
European system stand firmly on legal grounds. 
 
Still, it can well be argued that crucial CJEU rulings such as 
the one in the Frankovich have come as a consequence of 
the Court’s reasoning of the direct effect principle. In fact 
the case of Frankovich concerned member states’ liability to 
pay compensation to individuals who happened to suffer a 
loss for their governments failure to implement a certain 
EU directive or regulation within their national legislation. 
Thus, the Court effectively deepened the impact of its 
direct effect doctrine some 20 years after the latter has been 
adopted. This would be unlikely to happen if the national 
courts were to avoid the incorporation of the direct effect 
doctrine within their legal systems. The whole process was 
evidently triggered by the early choice that the judges in 
CJEU made to close other alternative options with the Van 
Gend en Loos ruling. This choice has clearly generated the 
self-reinforcing path dependency processes in the 
subsequent case-law. The argument of path dependency is 
again valid as the judgment in Frankovich would never be 
possible if direct effect was not established in advance. And 
this is exactly the pattern of processes that historical 
institutionalists would expect to observe as a result of the 
precedents that the EU judges have baldly set in the 1960s. 
It has to be noted that the Court followed the doctrine 
established in Frankovich in a later case (Case C-213/89 
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commonly known as Factortame) to widen even further the 
range to which it can be applied by redefining the principle 
of effectiveness in cases where member state liability for 
obstructing Union law is involved. 
 
In any case for some of the above reasons I am going to 
reveal the pattern of path dependency and critical juncture 
in the Court’s case-law in other cases and subsequent 
rulings where the Court could have followed a different 
approach without having the practical necessities of 
altering the status quo. It seems that the interpretation of 
the judges in Luxembourg regarding the internal market 
and its famous freedoms of movement can be given as an 
illustrative example in this context. The critical juncture 
here would be the well-known Cassis de Dijon and 
Dassonvile rulings that were issues by the Court in the 
1970s.  
 
Just like in other free trade areas the Union’s definition of 
free movement was originally defined as the prohibition of 
discrimination.122 In other words the national authorities 
should not discriminate external actors to the extent that 
the latter do not violate domestic regulations. Through its 
1974 Dassonvile ruling the Court of Justice stated that 
Belgian legislation constituted a measure having equivalent 
effect to a quantitative restriction on imports and is thus in 
violation with the Treaty. Later on in its 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
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 Schmidt, Susanne. Path Dependency of Case-Law and the Free movement 
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ruling, concerning a certain piece of German legislation 
having to do with the amount of alcohol in beverages, the 
Court softened the range of the measures of equivalent 
effect principle by giving a clearer definition of the cases in 
which the principle works. However, the most significant 
implication of the Cassis de Dijon ruling was the 
establishment of the principle of mutual recognition which 
implied that products that were legally produced in a 
member state should be freely introduced in the markets of 
other member states.  
 
In brief the Court of Justice defined the freedom of 
movement of goods as a prohibition of restriction rather 
than being simply a commitment to no discrimination 
between domestic and imported goods. Litigation in some 
of the further cases however led to the application of the 
same reasoning behind the definition of the other freedoms. 
The Dassonvile/Cassis de Dijon interpretation of the Court 
was soon applied to the cases regarding another freedom of 
movement – that of services. The 1990 Sager case was about 
a British firm that wanted to enter the German market in its 
industry. In Germany however the relevant sector featured 
stricter regulation and the firm had to obtain additional 
license. The Court reconfirmed its freedom of trade 
reasoning by claiming that: 
 
‚Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all 
discrimination against a person providing services on the grounds of 
his nationality, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
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without distinction to national providers of services and to those of 
other Member States<‛ 
 
The free movement of people within the internal market 
was initially restricted to labor related activities. Similarly 
to the pre-Dassonville interpretation the Court was 
applying the non-discrimination reasoning whenever it had 
to deal with cases concerning the free movement of 
workers. In 1993, however, in one of its most famous 
rulings in the so called Bosman case the judges decided that 
the system of transfer fees in European football is in fact 
‚an obstacle to the freedom of movement‛. Prior to Bosman 
a football team had to pay a transfer fee to a player’s club in 
order to attract him when the contract with his ex-team 
expires. However, it was often the case that the amount of 
this fee is set too high so that players are forced to prolong 
their contracts. The Court found that this system is indeed 
not a discriminatory one but constitutes a restriction to the 
free movement of workers. Thus, practically extending the 
scope of European law once again, the CJEU followed the 
already well-known pattern of changing its interpretation 
of the freedoms of movement to one that is opposed to 
restrictions instead of the mere prohibition of 
discrimination.  
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CONCLUSION: 
 
An Instrument or a Key 
Decision-Maker 
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The present dissertation examined the Court of Justice of 
the European Union from neoinstitutional perspectives. 
The achieved aim of the author to shift the focus of the 
Court’s analysis from exogenous to internal factors seems 
to have proven successfully that it is exactly New 
Institutionalism that is the most appropriate theoretical 
framework to serve as a basis to approach the institution. 
The Court of Justice is illustrated as a rational player acting 
strategically to defend its institutional preferences and 
agenda.  
 
The thesis presents the most extensive dataset of 
annulment action cases ruled by the CJEU. In a series of 
tests I check for the impact on the Court’s decision making 
of all publicly accessible extra-legal variables for which 
there are certain theoretical expectations of effect. One of 
the main findings concerns the lack of empirical evidence 
from the CJEU to support essentially the extra-legal model 
of judicial decision making. These results are still in line 
with the argument that in smaller courts the legal factors 
prevail for having a high level of collegiality which triggers 
stronger interpersonal interactions that allow the 
occurrence of different legal perspectives when justices 
elaborate on their approach to each separate case. The 
nationality of the justices, as well as the policies that the 
annulment cases concern, do not appear to sustain the 
preferences of certain political agendas within the Court of 
Justice. 
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On the other hand, the test for an overall influence of 
national over supranational interests seem to materialize 
the intergovernmentalist arguments that member state 
governments have better chances to file successful 
applications of annulment actions. This statistically 
significant effect might be partly explained by the stricter 
rules for admissibility which the treaty applies to potential 
non-governmental applicants. However, a deeper within-
member-state analysis reveals that the three most powerful 
EU members, which are also the biggest net contributors to 
the Union’s budget, are doing much better than their 
counterparts in terms of success in the annulment actions 
that they initiated. This effect is significant and stays 
constant through the tests of all case progress stages. Even 
though this is the main finding provided by the regression 
analysis, its magnitude is constrained to the fact that 
national actors are only successful in less than 30% of their 
annulment actions. Moreover, most of these cases concern 
only a couple of EU legislation areas - agriculture and 
competition.  
 
In any event, further research is needed to develop the legal 
models of CJEU judicial decision making. The presented 
novel dataset contributes to decrease the lack of a proper 
extensive quantitative approach that annulment action 
cases definitely deserve. The Court of Justice tends to take 
into account which member state is involved in its cases 
and it is more likely to rule in favor of the bigger states 
compared to those that contribute less to the EU budget. 
152 
 
Thus, the institution inevitably fits the definition of a 
rational agent in neoinstitutionalist context. The ratio (more 
than 70%) of the Court’s decisions in favor of EU legislation 
contested for annulment however comes to reveal that in 
general the institution is not that dependent on national 
preferences as intergovernmentalism would suggest. This 
extra-legal motivation behind the Court’s rulings is 
therefore more likely to stem from its own institutional 
agenda which is by default in line with the idea of 
deepening and widening the processes European 
integration. The long term rationale of the CJEU is 
consequently based on the idea of increasing the scope of 
its competences. Then it is logically to conclude that the 
Court considers member states’ preferences only to the 
extent to which the latter do not threaten the endurance of 
the EU legal doctrines established by the Court of Justice or 
the survival of the institution per se.  
 
The references that the CJEU had to deal with under the 
preliminary ruling procedure have naturally enabled the 
Court to put forward its interpretation of European law. 
The institution managed to take advantage and has been 
seen to exert a form of judicial activism that led to certain 
outcomes that were unexpected or/and undesired by the 
member states but were at the same time practically 
irreversible for the relatively high costs of a relevant 
political reaction that could potentially undo this impact.  
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The autonomy that judicial institutions feature by default 
may have facilitated the Court of Justice in this endeavor. 
As shown in Chapter IV, rational institutionalism seems to 
explain appropriately the Court’s assessment of its 
decision-making powers which allow it to act so that it has 
clearly widened the scope of its competences and 
supranational tendencies through the means of legal 
integration. The annulment cases as well as the timing and 
the overall circumstances around the precedents that 
established the most challenging legal doctrines of the 
judges in Luxembourg attest for the fact that the Court has 
been aware of the competing political interests that its 
rulings concerned. The case-law that was generated as a 
result of the precedents within the preliminary ruling 
procedure however is rather an illustration of historical 
institutionalist arguments. Indeed any Court is supposed to 
be consistent in the long-term of its reasoning so the CJEU 
is not an exception for abiding by the precedents that it has 
itself set.  
 
The variance between Union law application in the CJEU 
and in the national courts of the member states can be 
clearly depicted. Member state courts consider their 
constitution as the supreme legal norm. They interpret EU 
law to a degree to which it is in comfort with the 
constitution. At the same time the Court of Justice takes the 
Treaties in an identical manner. Even though one should 
acknowledge recent developments such as including 
member states constitutional traditions in the text of the 
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Lisbon Treaty or the decision that fundamental human 
rights present a principle of law that is to be recognized in 
the EU, it is evident that the Court considers the treaties as 
supreme by default. In a reality of this forced coexistence 
the national courts had to adopt the legal principles that the 
CJEU adopted. On the other hand the Court of Justice 
managed to balance its approach to the ‘national vs Union 
law’ divergence to the extent to which the courts of the 
member states would be likely to accept.123 The Kompetenz-
Kompetenz issue that occurred as a result of a decision by 
the German supreme court was addressed by the CJEU 
judges in exactly this manner as in their consequent case 
law they started referring to principles and rights evolving 
out of the national constitutions of the EU members. The 
inclusion of the Fundamental Charter of Human Rights in 
the Lisbon Treaty comes as a solid argument for the 
historical institutionalist concept of path dependent 
determinism in European legal integration. 
 
In any case it has been shown that the overall pattern that 
the Court established and followed in its case-law 
whenever it had to interpret EU law can be generalized in 
historical institutionalist terms as a sequence of critical 
junctures that predetermined a self-reinforcing process of 
path dependency. As a rational actor and a judicial 
institution which foremost goal is to survive the CJEU has 
to stick to the legal principles it created. For this reasons it 
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seems that for the majority of the preliminary ruling cases it 
could be a potentially fruitful exercise to look deeper trying 
to figure out which were the national interests that the 
Court ignored or took into account in its rulings on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
In brief, the Court of Justice is an institution that can hardly 
fit the definition of being an agent of national interests even 
though it was revealed that it is sensitive to their agenda 
for having a clear correlation between the Court’s rulings 
and the national preferences of the most powerful EU 
member states. It would be more proper to argue that 
depending on certain circumstances the Court of Justice 
arbitrarily selects to act as an instrument in the hands of 
member states. This reaction however seems to be a part of 
the Court's long-term strategy of being a decision maker 
with increased competences and a key actor quickening the 
processes of EU integration.  
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